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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement 
There are 44 district municipalities (DMs) in South Africa.  The Local Government: 
Municipal Structures Act
1
 states one of the main objectives of a district council is to ‘seek to 
achieve the integrated, sustainable and equitable social and economic development of its area 
as a whole’ and it aims to achieve this through integrated planning, bulk infrastructural 
development, building local capacity and equitable distribution of resources.
2
 There are four 
core functions districts were expected to perform after December 2000.
3
 These are (a) potable 
water, (b) bulk supply of electricity, (c) domestic waste-water and sewage and (d) sewage 
disposal systems. However, a large number of DMs are not performing these core functions 
as strong local municipalities (LMs) are performing them
4
. LMs will continue to provide bulk 
electricity services until national restructuring of the industry is complete.
5
 Of the 44 DMs, 
21 are Water Service Authorities (WSAs) and 15 are both WSAs and Water Service 
Providers (WSPs).
6
    
The performance of the above-mentioned functions becomes important when considering the 
funding of DMs. Previously DMs had three main sources of revenue, namely tariffs for 
services, Regional Services Council (RSC) levies and intergovernmental transfers.
7
 Many 
DMs did not perform any core services and thus could not collect tariffs. The scrapping of the 
RSC levy meant that DMs ‘may no longer be able to fulfil the key functions...of coordination, 
redistribution and cross-subsidisation...’8 The RSC levy allowed DMs to identify and finance 
projects and monitor its implementation and enabled DMs to set the agenda for district 
forums.
9
 The removal of the levy thus resulted not only in a loss of revenue but also in a loss 
of authority and function.  In 2006 the RSC levy was scrapped and left DMs without a large 
                                                 
1
 17 of 1998 (Structures Act). 
2
 Section 83(3)(a)-(d).  
3
 Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Act 33 of 2000 (Amendment Act). 
4
 Steytler N and Baatjies R (2007) Redefining the Role and Application of District Municipalities  7.  
5
 Steytler and Baatjies (2007) 16.  
6
 Department  of  Water Affairs: 2011 Blue Drop Report.  
7
 Palmer I (2009)  ‘An assessment of the performance of district municipalities’ in Steytler N (ed) Municipal    
   Demarcation Board 10
th
 Year Celebration: The First Decade of the Municipal Demarcation Board: Some    
   Reflections on Demarcating Local Government in South Africa  90. 
8
 Mlokoti V (2007) ’Are District Municipalities Still Relevant?’ 9(2) Local Government Law Bulletin 8. 
9
 Mlokoti  (2007) 8. 
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portion of their revenue income. The levy was substituted by National Treasury (NT) with a 
levy replacement grant of an equivalent amount.  
The Equitable Share (ES) transfer is largely based on the number of poor consumers within 
the district and what service function the district is performing, with water being the main 
service.
10
 Palmer noted variability in transfers between strong and weak district economies 
when he highlighted that the transfer system favours economically strong districts, which 
goes against the concept of equity.
11
 It is important to note that these strong districts have 
little or no service delivery obligations. DMs thus became institutions largely funded through 
grants. 
Funding is an important factor related to the effectiveness of districts but another salient 
factor is political differences. The two-tier system of local government, in which two separate 
political structures must cooperate on various matters, creates an environment for inevitable 
political contestation.
12
 This kind of conflict can potentially cripple the effectiveness of 
municipalities. Probably the most often cited cause of conflict relates to the overlap of 
powers and functions between DMs and LMs. This overlap creates unnecessary confusion 
around who is responsible for what. DMs and LMs can only function effectively if they act as 
a collective unit
13
 in light of their coordinating and redistributive role.     
DMs generally ‘are not performing their statutory responsibilities’, in fact, more functions are 
being moved to LMs.
14
 Along with the confusion this creates, corruption and 
maladministration add to the problems DMs are facing. The question to be asked is whether 
there is a need for change. Or, whether there is a problem with the system. This is why the 
two-tier system of local government is now under review and has led to policy proposals by 
the African National Congress (ANC).  
                                                 
10
 Palmer (2009) 91.   
11
 Palmer (2009) 92.  
12
 Steytler N and Jordan  J (2006) District-Local Municipal Relations: The Challenges to Cooperative  
    Government 17.  
13
 Mlokoti (2007) 8-9.   
14
 Steytler and Baatjies (2007) 27.  
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The ANC in its March 2012 national policy document outlined proposals on the future of 
districts.
15
 There are four policy proposals: 
 Leave the system as it is. 
 Abolish the two-tier system with more category ‘A’ type municipalities. 
 Create a new type of category ‘A’ municipality. 
 Reform the role of districts by (i) strengthening the planning, coordination and support 
functions, (ii) retaining districts only in certain areas, or (iii) absorbing districts into 
national or provincial administrations.  
At the June 2012 policy conference the commissions resolved that there should be a 
differentiated system of local government. With regard to the policy proposals the 
commissions resolved that strong LMs would be removed from DMs. They resolved further 
that DMs should focus on strengthening the planning, coordination and support functions of 
LMs; that there should be a new funding model for DMs; and that government use 
infrastructure development programmes to strengthen DMs.  
Abolition of the two-tier system of local government is no longer an option. The objective is 
to remove strong LMs from DMs and create new category A’s within the existing framework. 
This is more manageable and would not require constitutional amendment but instead, 
amendment of the Structures Act. The immediate problem is how do we define strong LMs? 
What constitutes the criteria for deciding on a definition? What are the financial 
consequences of removing strong LMs from DMs?  
Financial viability is an unchanging, objective fact. Viable and sustainable local 
economies/revenue sources cannot be transplanted or created out of thin air. For DMs their 
locational situation is permanent. In addition, it is also difficult to attract skilled personnel to 
DMs in deep rural areas. Stating that strong LMs will be removed from DMs is thus a policy 
problem because how do we decide what constitutes strong?      
Policy reform is shaped by the likely impacts that either constrain or open up possibilities. 
Examining the existing literature on DMs, there is remarkably little analysis of the likely 
impacts. How many personnel are employed in DMs? How many politicians? What are the 
district functions? What are the financial implications? What value is added, and where is the 
                                                 
15
 ANC Policy Discussion Document on ‘Legislature and Governance’ March 2012  20-3. Available at    
    http://www.anc.org.za/docs/discus/2012/legislaturek.pdf  (Accessed 04/07/2012). 
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value added? The problem is that policy debates on reform are often conducted in the absence 
of any empirical research.  
This study will be looking at the future of DMs, and in particular, what the broader likely 
impacts may be of any policy shift. There is strong recognition within national government as 
evidenced in the policy document, that the current two-tier system is untenable. There is thus 
appetite for functional, institutional and operational reform but not for large-scale 
restructuring. The focus of the study is therefore a discussion of the likely impact of the 
policy proposals and how it may/will constrain or facilitate adoption and implementation of 
the policy choice.    
1.2 Research Question 
As described above, this study is informed by the policy debate around the two-tier system of 
local government. Accordingly, the focus of this is to examine the likely impacts of the 
policy choice. The policy document and related literature recognise that the problems facing 
DMs are complex and multi-faceted and that attempts at addressing the issues must consist of 
a cooperative effort between the spheres of government.  
The research is guided by two questions considering prospects for the reform of DMs. What 
are the likely impacts within which the proposals must be assessed? These are impacts on 
factors such as self-interest, political organisation and influence, services, personnel and 
finances. Do the likely impacts either constrain or facilitate the change? And what is the 
policy room to manoeuvre? The latter question takes on particular importance in light of the 
political dimension informing any policy decision and the fact that the ANC’s elective 
conference is happening December of 2012. Any kind of change to the two-tier system may 
see political casualties and would not be popular so close to the conference considering the 
intense succession debate currently raging.  
1.3 Argument  
There are serious consequences for the reform of two-tier local government in light of the 
likely impacts. The preferred policy shift would see the position of many politicians 
weakened. There is also a vested interest to continue with the current system as some officials 
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have used their position to unjustifiably enrich themselves. Then there is also the matter of 
personnel who would stand to be redeployed.  
Yet the ANC policy document is clear, ‘there are no advantages to retaining the current 
system as it is.’16 Maintaining the current status quo is apparently not an option for the ANC. 
What we are left with are proposals redefining the role of DMs requiring institutional and 
legislative reforms, or to abolish the two-tier system requiring constitutional amendment. 
There are divergent ideas on how to address the issues, hence the proposals in the policy 
document. The scrapping of the two-tier system does not seem a viable option considering it 
would require large-scale restructuring and constitutional amendment.  
However, there is a dearth of literature regarding the likely impacts of policy reform 
governing districts. It appears that scant attention has been paid to this, and the effect of 
implementing any recommended proposal and how it may influence any decision. In 
developing a new model, necessity dictates that we take into account current realities that 
may influence policy choices.  
However, any policy reform and implementation cannot occur in a vacuum. It must consider 
the likely impacts within which reform will be implemented and it must consider the effect 
policy reform may have on the likely impacts. This is of paramount importance and will 
allow for the effective management of the changes policy reform brings.  
It will be shown the ease or otherwise with which the policy reform could be implemented. 
Therefore, this study will be framed around the likely impacts in light of the policy proposals. 
1.4 Literature Review 
There is consensus that DMs have not been efficient or cost-effective and have failed in the 
performance of duties assigned to them.
17
 This is of course the basis for the ANC’s review of 
the two-tier system of local government as evidenced in their policy document. Atkinson et al 
stated that the role of DMs remains unclear and that this has severely hampered capacity-
building at both levels.
18
 Steytler
19
 asserted that amendments to the Structures Act in 2000 
                                                 
16
 Policy Document (2012) 20.  
17
 Palmer (2009) 99-100, Mlokoti (2007) 9, Steytler and Jordan (2006) 17.  
18
 Atkinson et al (2003) The Role of District Municipalities: Final Report  4. 
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(which viewed districts as major drivers of development by making them providers of key 
services) were a clear departure from the White Paper
20
, which envisioned a limited role for 
districts. Coordinating, equitable redistribution, capacity-building and developmental 
mandates of DMs are what the White Paper envisioned. The shifting of powers and functions 
between DMs and LMs created added confusion around responsibility. Clarity around powers 
and functions thus remained problematic. The literature on the subject suggests that the role 
of DMs be revised as they are more active in rural areas and that DMs should be 
depoliticised.
21
 Kirkby et al reinforce this point by stating that municipalities claim as their 
greatest challenge functional grey areas around powers and functions between district and 
local municipalities.
22
  
The literature identifies similar issues that reduce the effectiveness of municipalities. 
Atkinson et al further asserted that political organisation at district level is too problematic 
and that there exists no evidence substantiating democratic government at district level.
23
 
Baatjies suggested that a distinctive two-tier system has developed characterised by ‘relations 
of hierarchy, a lack of coordination, and in the end, of competition’.24  Yet district and local 
government are mandated to act coherently and in mutual cooperation.
25
  
In light of this there has been little research done on the likely impacts and how the impacts 
would be affected by any proposed policy shift. Palmer
26
 has done some research examining 
the funding model of DMs in terms of capital and operational expenditure and its continued 
viability. This research is thus seeking to cover an important gap in terms of the political, 
human and financial conditions which may influence, or be influenced by, any decision.   
                                                                                                                                                        
19
 Steytler N (2009) ‘Demarcating District Municipalities’ in Steytler N (ed) Municipal   Demarcation Board 
    10
th
 Year Celebration: The First Decade of the Municipal Demarcation Board: Some  Reflections on  
    Demarcating Local Government in South Africa  81.  
20
 The White Paper on Local Government 1998  Section D 3.2  (White Paper).  
21
 Atkinson (2003) 51, Baatjies R (2008) Redefining the Political Structure of District Municipalities 7-8.  
22
 Kirkby et al (2007) ‘Towards a More Cooperative Local Government: The Challenge of District  
    Intergovernmental Forums’ 22 (1) SA Public Law 149.   
23
 Atkinson (2003) 51.  
24
 Baatjies (2008) 2.  
25
 Section 41(1) (c)(h) Constitution of Republic of South Africa, 1996.   
26
 Palmer (2009). 
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1.5 Methodology  
To answer the research questions this study will be based on a desk-top review of the relevant 
data, literature, legislation, reports and policy documents and will follow a critical and 
analytical approach. The research will consist of mainly primary and secondary sources. In 
terms of primary sources this study will rely on the Constitution and local government 
legislation encompassing the legal framework that regulates local government powers and 
functions. Secondary sources to be used are books, academic articles, policy documents and 
reports, which constitute the bulk of the sources utilised. It also places reliance on research 
and reports from various sources and related information will be gathered and collated by the 
author. Internet sites will also be used to collect relevant data and information.  
1.6 Overview of chapters 
The argument will be developed over five chapters. 
 Chapter 2 will consist of a review of the structure of the two-tier system of local 
government in South Africa. It will discuss the Constitution and the purpose of DMs in 
terms of the White Paper and powers and functions in the Structures Act and 
amendments. It will then discuss demarcation and conclude with the proclamations of 
2000 and 2003.  
 Chapter 3 will look at the current functions of DMs and discuss the background to the 
changes. Some information will be presented in table format. The main points will be 
isolated and any patterns established will be discussed.   
 Chapter 4 will focus on the policy debate. It will focus on the various policy proposals 
and consider the outcome of the ANC policy conference.  
 Chapter 5 will analyse the likely impact of the ANC policy choice on the current 
practice of local government relating to councillors, political party, services, personnel 
and finances.  
 Chapter 6 will conclude by looking at the interplay between the likely impacts and the 
policy proposal. It will analyse how these likely impacts on the practice of local 
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government, will/may influence the adoption and implementation of the policy choice. 
In short, what is the space within which the reforms can be implemented? And will the 
likely impacts constrain or facilitate the proposed reform? It will conclude with a 
recommendation.  
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Chapter Two: Overview of the structure of district 
municipalities 
  2.1     Introduction  
This discussion focuses on the legal framework underpinning the system of two-tier local 
government. To this end it will discuss the Constitution as the source of policy and 
legislation, the vision in the White Paper that provided the policy intent underpinning the 
legislative framework, the Structures Act of 1998 and Local Government: Structures 
Amendment Act of 2000.
27
  
  2.2 Legal Framework 
2.2.1 The Constitution 1996 
The Constitution
28
 provides for three categories of municipality, i.e., A, B and C. Category A 
municipalities are referred to as self-standing (metros) and have exclusive authority in their 
area. Category B municipalities share authority with a category C municipality ‘within whose 
area it falls’, which means that a category C municipality has authority in an area that 
consists of more than one category B municipality.
29
 This sharing of authority refers to a 
sharing of powers and functions as enumerated within Schedules 4B and 5B of the 
Constitution.
30
 The Constitution also gives municipalities’ original revenue raising powers. 
Section 229(1)(a) provides that a municipality may impose rates on property and surcharges 
on service fees and (b) that a municipality may impose authorised taxes, levies and duties 
appropriate to a specific category of municipality.  
The Constitution further directed Parliament to enact legislation allocating municipal powers 
and functions between categories B and C municipalities. Section 155(3)(c) provides for an 
asymmetrical system that allows for differentiation of powers and functions between category 
B and category C municipalities. Section 155(3)(c) directed Parliament to enact national 
legislation that must ‘make provision for an appropriate division of powers and functions 
                                                 
27
 33 of  2000 (Amendment Act). 
28
 Section 155(1). 
29
 Section 155(1)(b). 
30
 For a detailed exposition see Steytler N and De Visser J Local Government Law Issue 4 (2011) 5-31 - 5-34. 
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between municipalities when an area has of both category B and category C.’ This is a 
qualified provision subject to section 229 of the Constitution which provides a set of criteria
31
 
for the allocation of municipal fiscal powers and functions between the categories. 
The idea of a two-tier system of local government was not an entirely new one; district 
councils have been active in various parts of the country for many years, with the divisional 
councils of the Cape Province as an example.
32
 The paradigm shift that occurred was the 
constitutional recognition of local government as a sphere of government
33
 and its executive 
and legislative authority.
34
 Together with this, the Constitution adds another dimension by 
providing a developmental mandate
35
 directing local government to prioritise basic needs and 
promote development within communities. This development mandate is what drives local 
government, and powers and functions to this effect are divided between local and district 
municipalities accordingly. Although the constitutional text gave no content to the three 
categories the Constitutional Court gave some indication of what such content may be:
36
 
‘The effect of these amendments is to specify three different categories of municipalities that can be 
established. In substance these are (a) self-standing municipalities, (b) municipalities that form part of a 
comprehensive coordinating structure, and (c) municipalities that perform coordinating functions. In 
the terminology of existing legislation the third category would include structures such as regional and 
metropolitan councils.’ 
2.2.2 White Paper on Local Government 1998 
The White Paper on Local Government published in 1998 outlined principles and 
institutional arrangements that proposed a framework to aid the reconstruction and 
development of South Africa by recognising local government as the locus for 
implementation. The White Paper recognised the fact that while some ‘challenges can only be 
dealt with at local level…[o]ther challenges play themselves out on a larger scale, and clearly 
                                                 
31
 Section 229(3) 
32
 Palmer (2009) 88.  
33
 Section 40(1).  
34
 Section 156(a).  
35
 Section 153(a).  
36
 In re: Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1997 (1) 
    BCLR 1 (CC) para 77.     
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demand regional attention through some form of cross-municipal authority.’37 It is within this 
framework that the roles and responsibilities of district government were first articulated:
38
   
 Integrated development planning for the district as a whole (coordinating); 
 Capacity building; 
 Economic development; and 
 Providing services where municipal administration is non-viable – in so-called 
District Management Areas (DMAs). 
Clearly, dealing with issues at a regional level and building capacity at local level is what the 
drafters of the White Paper envisaged when they designed the two-tier system of local 
government. The White Paper accepted that a measure of uniformity would give municipal 
councils consistency while simultaneously recognising that due to the nature of variable 
settlement types a measure of differentiation would be required to build a measure of 
flexibility into the district government system.
39
 The White Paper thus envisaged a 
differentiated or asymmetrical system as the preferred option: ‘A variable district government 
system is envisaged in which districts exercise different sets of powers vis-à-vis their areas 
and the local municipalities that comprise them, depending on local circumstances.’40  
To conclude, the White Paper envisaged the roles and responsibilities of DMs as that of 
providing technical assistance, coordinating integrated planning for the district as a whole, 
ensuring access to bulk infrastructure and providing direct services in DMAs.  
2.2.3 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 1998 
The Structures Act was enacted the same year as the White Paper and was the legislative 
framework that gave expression to the policy intent in the White Paper. Although the 
Constitution provided for the categories of municipalities it did not provide definitions but 
instead directed Parliament to enact legislation that would define the categories.
41
 The 
Structures Act therefore sets the criteria that define the type of municipality for the three 
categories:
42
 Category A = Metropolitan Municipality, Category B = Local Municipality, 
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39
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Category C = District Municipality. The Act defined the criteria for the establishment of a 
Metropolitan Municipality as follows: 
2.   Areas which must have category A municipalities - An area must have a single category A 
municipality if that area can reasonably be regarded as—  
   (a)   a conurbation featuring— 
              (i) areas of high population density; 
              (ii) an intense movement of people, goods, and services; 
              (iii) extensive development; and 
              (iv) multiple business districts and industrial areas;  
   (b)   a centre of economic activity with a complex and diverse economy; 
   (c)   a single area for which integrated development planning is desirable;  
           and 
   (d)   having strong interdependent social and economic linkages between its 
           constituent units. 
Section 3 states that if an area does not meet the set of criteria listed in section 2, that area 
must consist of category B and C municipalities.  
Section 83(3) provides that one of the main objectives of a district council is to ‘seek to 
achieve the integrated, sustainable and equitable social and economic development of its area 
as a whole’. This must be achieved through the following developmental mandates: 
(a) integrated planning,  
(b) bulk infrastructural development,  
(c) building local capacity, and  
(d) equitable distribution of resources.  
 
Section 84(1)(a) to (p) provides for the powers and functions of DMs ‘that give effect to the 
stated developmental mandates of district municipalities’. Section 84(2) provides that powers 
and functions not enumerated for DMs fall to LMs as residual powers
43
, and those 
enumerated in Schedules 4B and 5B.
44
 The main functions for DMs listed in section 84(1) are 
(b) potable water supply systems, (c) bulk supply of electricity, (d) waste-water and 
sewerage, and (i) municipal health. This division of power in section 84(1) is not immutable; 
section 84(3) makes provision for the Minister to authorise a LM to perform a function or 
exercise a power in relation to the above-mentioned four main functions. Section 85(1) 
provides further that powers and functions between DMs and LMs may be moved between 
the two. The non-assignable functions are integrated development planning for the district, 
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distribution of grants and the imposition and collection of taxes.
45
 Section 85(2) provides that 
the MEC can adjust remaining powers and functions only if the municipality lacks the 
capacity and he/she has consulted the MDB capacity assessment of that particular 
municipality.  
In sum, the role envisaged for DMs in the Structures Act, and giving effect to the White 
Paper, is that of coordinator and provider of bulk services. The only exception is where DMs 
provide frontline services in the DMAs.
46
    
2.2.4 Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Act 33 of   
            2000.   
The Structures Act as an expression of the White Paper envisaged the role of DMs as that of 
coordinator and bulk provider of services. This changed with the introduction of the 
Amendment Act as DMs were converted from coordinators and providers of bulk services to 
that of direct service provider to end-users. Steytler and Baatjies noted that what the 
amendments ushered in was a clear departure from the White Paper in that it now regarded 
DMs as the main drivers of development by making them direct service providers of the four 
main functions: water, electricity, sewerage and health services.
47
  
According to Atkinson, the MDB were of the opinion that district local government was 
better placed to manage the equitable redistribution of resources, which is what the 
Amendment Act envisaged.
48
 Steytler and Baatjies added that a major reason for the shift was 
the perceived redistributive capacity DMs were thought to possess.
49
 This was a view 
supported by the Department of Local Government.
50
 Steytler noted that NT was not in 
favour of this and held the view that redistribution is the prerogative of central government, 
which was supported by the Financial and Fiscal Commission, who agreed that powers and 
                                                 
45
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functions should not be determined by issues of redistribution as that should be the core 
concern of central government.
51
  
Part of the rationale to move the major functions to DMs was based on the fact that ‘there 
could be a mismatch between the functions and powers of a district and local municipality 
and its ability to exercise those powers and perform those functions.’52 The changes ushered 
in by the Amendment Act were not absolute; the Minister may shift the allocated powers and 
functions to LMs.
53
 This, according to Steytler and Jordan, allowed for wide variation in the 
number and type of powers and functions DMs could perform, creating an asymmetrical 
system of allocations across districts.
54
  
2.2.5 Taxing Powers of districts 
Section 229 of the Constitution deals with municipal fiscal powers and functions and 
provides that a municipality may impose (a) rates on property and surcharges on fees, and (b) 
if authorised by national legislation, other taxes, levies and duties; but that no municipality 
may impose income tax, value-added tax, general sales tax or customs duty. Therefore, 
property tax and tax on services provided are allocated exclusively to municipalities. Section 
229(3) provides that taxes must be appropriately assigned when fiscal powers and functions 
are shared and must be done in terms of national legislation.  
Section 84(1)(p) of the Structures Act provides that DMs have the power to impose and 
collect taxes as it relates to assigned fiscal powers and functions between DMs and LMs. 
Section 84(2) of the Structures Act provides further that powers and functions not 
enumerated for DMs fall to LMs. The collection of property tax is not enumerated in section 
84(1) and therefore falls to LMs. However, section 89 of the Structures Act states that DMs 
have all the municipal powers and functions in DMAs.   
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Section 2(2)(a) of the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act
55
 states that DMs 
may not collect property rates, except in DMAs. Municipalities may collect authorised taxes. 
The RSC levy was an authorised tax and accounted for roughly 34 percent of district 
income.
56
 The scrapping of the RSC levies by NT in 2006 thus stripped DMs of an important 
source of revenue.
57
 The levy was substituted with a replacement grant that was equal to 
revenue DMs raised through the levy. This left district finances at the discretion of NT and as 
mentioned previously it is the position of NT that redistribution is a central government 
concern.  
2.3 Conclusion 
The initial aim for DMs as envisaged in the White Paper was that they would coordinate 
planning, build capacity, facilitate economic development and provide services in non-viable 
areas or DMAs. However, the first shift came in 2000 when the Amendment Act made DMs 
full service providers to end-users of the four key functions of water, electricity, sewerage 
and health services. This was based in part on the perceived redistributive qualities DMs were 
thought to possess. There was a second counter-shift that occurred and instead of increasing 
the financial powers of DMs NT pulled the rug from under them by removing about a third of 
their income. NT had the power to scrap the RSC levy as it was an authorised and not 
original tax. As noted earlier NT were never satisfied with part of the rationale for the first 
shift in 2000. DMs could only have property tax in DMAs but there was no real property to 
speak of in these areas as they were so very sparsely populated. This left DMs as largely 
grant funded institutions raising little or no own revenue.  
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Chapter Three:  Implementation and Functioning 
    3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the functioning and critique of the current system of district 
government. It will start by outlining the demarcation process followed by the 2003 
authorisations. It will then focus on the functioning of DMs and discuss the critique of the 
functioning of DMs.   
    3.2 Demarcation 
At the start of the demarcation process in 1999 there was no criteria for the MDB to define 
how DMs were to be demarcated. At the time there were Transitional Rural Councils (TRCs) 
that had similar powers to Transitional Local Councils (TLCs) such as taxing powers but with 
limited potential to raise adequate revenue.
58
 There were therefore rural areas that were not 
completely devoid of local administrative structures.  
The demarcation of DMs (and LMs) was informed by criteria set out in sections 24 and 25 of 
the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act.
59
 Of the set criteria only one had 
relevance – the equitable provision of services – which would allow for the cross-
subsidisation of resources between municipalities with high/low capacity.
60
 Steytler noted 
that the true criteria for demarcating DMs were to be deduced from assigned powers and 
functions with the difficulty being that ‘[w]hile the districts are being demarcated in 2000, 
their functions [were] being amended at the same time.’61  
The net result of the 2000 demarcation process was that the MDB demarcated 6 metros, 232 
LMs and 47 DMs. What was of significance was the ‘low number of local municipalities into 
which the districts were disaggregated.’62 Nearly two-thirds or 63 percent of DMs consisted 
of between 4 and 6 LMs with one third composed of 5 LMs. Large DMs comprising of more 
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than 7 LMs were few (17.4 percent), and 19.5 percent comprised of three or less LMs.
63
 
Currently there are 44 DMs. This is due to the disestablishment of Bohlabela DM as a result 
of the termination of cross-boundary municipalities in 2005, and later disestablishment of 
Metsweding and Motheo DMs during 2011 based on viability as determined by the MDB.   
 3.3 Authorisations  
The demarcation process of 2000 happened at the same time that district functions were being 
amended. The four main functions of -
 
potable water, bulk supply of electricity, sewerage and 
health services - were allocated to DMs but legislative provision was made for the Minister of 
Provincial and Local Government to authorise the shifting of functions to LMs. Section 
84(3)(a) of the Structures Act allows the Minister to move functions between DMs and LMs. 
The Minister only has to consult the national Minister responsible for the functional area and 
the MEC for local government in the province. This ability to shift powers and functions 
allowed for more variation in terms of what functions DMs could perform, which resulted in 
a de facto asymmetrical system.
64
  
The Minister authorised the shifting of functions on a temporary basis, gazetted in November 
2000 and valid until 30 June 2003
65
, which meant that newly established LMs would 
continue to perform the functions which disestablished TLCs used to perform in order to 
avoid service delivery disruptions.
66
 LMs would therefore continue to provide water, 
sanitation, electricity and municipal health services directly to end users. Important to note is 
that DMs did not lose the power or function; the LM was merely empowered through the 
authorisation to perform the function or exercise the power in its area.
67
  
 3.3.1 C1 and C2 Authorisations 2003 (WSAs/WSPs) 
The Minister revoked the authorisations on 13 January 2003 and decided that electricity 
reticulation would continue to be supplied by LMs, but water and sanitation would be linked 
and managed on a provincial basis (considering the specific circumstances of each 
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municipality) and municipal health services provided by DMs.
68
 With reference to water 
Steytler and Baatjies noted that in response to criticisms against the allocation of a service-
delivery role for DMs the MDB proposed the separation of the  service authority function 
from the service provider function.
69
 In practice this meant that DMs could retain the service 
authority function of setting policy and taking strategic responsibility, while outsourcing the 
operational function to LMs. Steytler and Baatjies noted that the Minister’s proclamation 
resulted in the following:
70
  
‘All local municipalities in Gauteng, Free State, Northern Cape and Western Cape would continue 
providing bulk water supply and sanitation. In the Eastern Cape and Limpopo, only two local 
municipalities would perform bulk water and sanitation functions while in KwaZulu-Natal only three 
local municipalities would do so. In Mpumalanga local municipalities in three of the four districts, in 
North West local municipalities in two districts and in Northern Cape local municipalities in only one 
district were authorised to perform water and sanitation functions. In sum, local municipalities were 
authorised to continue providing water and sanitation functions in 22 of the 46 districts.’ 
In total the Minister proclaimed 152 WSAs in South Africa, of which 8 are metros (category 
As), 123 are LMs (category Bs) and 21 are DMs (category Cs).
71
 Of the DMs only 15 of 21 
are performing the full function, while the other 6 DMs have delegated the function to LMs 
or municipal entities (their own or LMs). In order to distinguish between DMs that retained 
the water services function and those that did not, DMs were split into C1 and C2 categories. 
C1 categorisation represents DMs that have no water service functions. C2 categorisation 
represents DMs that have water service functions. Considering that the ES allocation is based 
primarily on the number of poor consumers in an area, related to the water services function, 
it is useful to discuss DMs in terms of C1 and C2 categorisation. It is also useful, in relation 
to the discussion, to disaggregate between C2 DMs that are both WSAs/WSPs and cases 
where other institutions are performing the WSP function.  
Figure 1 reflects the number of C1 and C2 DMs per province. It shows the assignment of the 
water services function for DMs. (DMs that retained the WSA function)  
                                                 
68
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FIGURE 1: Represents the number of C1 and C2 DMs.
 
Source: National Blue Drop Report 2011. 
 
In figure 1 we see that in the Eastern Cape (EC), Kwa-Zulu Natal (KZN) and Limpopo (LP) 
the majority of DMs are C2s. Whereas Free State (FS), Gauteng (GP), Mpumalanga (MP), 
Northern Cape (NC) and Western Cape (WC) have no C2s. In these areas the water services 
function is primarily performed by LMs and municipal entities. The North West (NW) sees a 
50/50 split between DMs. As the graph indicates, C2 DMs have been favoured and are better 
represented in the EC, KZN and LP. C2s are mostly concentrated in and around the former 
homelands of Transkei in the EC, Kwa-Zulu in KZN and Lebowa, Gazankulu and Venda in 
LP. There are also 2 C2s in the former Bophuthatswana in the NW. MP does not have any C2 
DMs.  An inference may thus be drawn that the water services function was retained in rural 
DMs because of weak/newly established LMs in the former homelands. Furthermore, from a 
total of 21 C2 DMs, 19 can be found in three provinces. In total less than half of the 44 DMs 
are performing their statutory functions and the majority of those performing the functions 
are concentrated in three provinces. Although the Amendment Act empowered DMs to 
perform the water services function many were too weak/unable to perform the function. In 
addition, LMs were already adequately performing the water services function, however, in 
the former homelands there were no local government structures prior to 2000 and thus no 
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reason to re-authorise the water services function to LMs. Considering the fact that this 
decision was based on the LMs perceived ability/inability to perform the function, we may 
draw the inference that LMs were/are weaker in those three provinces. Conversely the same 
would apply to C1s; we may draw the inference that functions were not transferred to C1s 
based on their perceived ability/inability to perform the function. This raises an appropriate 
debate around capacity and function, which is fundamentally a ‘chicken and egg’ debate. 
Municipalities will become disincentivised to strengthen capacity if they are not responsible 
for performing the function, but they will also become disincentivised to accept responsibility 
to perform the function if they have capacity issues.  
Figure 2 reflects C2s per province and shows DMs that are WSAs only and those that are 
both WSAs/WSPs. LMs and municipal entities are mostly performing the function for DMs 
that are WSAs only. It also looks at how many DMs retained the WSP function as well. The 
C2s that are both WSAs/WSPs are using other WSPs to assist them in providing the service.  
 
FIGURE 2: Represents C2 DMs disaggregated between WSAs and WSPs per province.  
            
Source: National Blue Drop Report 2011.  
Of the 10 C2s in KZN, 7 are both WSAs/WSPs. In LP the 4 C2s are all both WSAs/WSPs 
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(21), 15 are both WSAs/WSPs and 6 are WSAs only. The Joe Gqabi DM in the EC is a WSA 
only and Elundini, Gariep, Maletswai and Senqu LMs, together with Amatola Water Board, 
are the WSPs. In KZN 3 DMs are WSAs only. In Umzimyathi DM Uhtukela Water Board is 
the WSP. In Zululand DM Abaqulusi LM and Water and Sanitation SA (WSSA) are the 
WSPs. In Amajuba DM Uthukela Water Board is the WSP. In the NW two DMs are WSAs 
only. In Dr Ruth Segomotsi Mompati DM it is Sedibeng and Botshelo Water Boards that are 
the WSPs. In Ngaka Modiri Molema DM it is Ditsobotla, Ramotsere Moiloa and Mafikeng 
LMs that are the WSPs.  
Of the 15 DMs that are both WSAs/WSPs almost all of them are using other WSPs to assist 
them in performing the function on an agency basis. In the EC three DMs (Alfred Nzo, Chris 
Hani and OR Tambo) have contracted out the entire WSP function and in Amathole DM the 
bulk of the WSP function is performed by Amathole Water. In KZN only Uthukela DM is the 
sole WSP in its area. The other six DMs in KZN have contracted out large parts of the WSP 
function. In LP there are no DMs that are the sole WSPs. Vhembe DM is the WSP in only 
one area. There is more or less a 50/50 split between the other DMs in LP who have 
contracted out the WSP function (in relation to areas where the function is performed). In 
summary, of the 44 DMs only 15 (34 percent) have both the WSA/WSP function and of that 
15 only 1 DM (in KZN) is the sole WSP for its area.
72
  
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
What is clear is that DMs perform no real functions in urban areas. DMs are predominantly 
performing functions in rural areas around weak locals. The majority of DMs that have the 
water services function are both WSAs/WSPs. However, even though 34 percent of DMs are 
both WSAs/WSPs, research shows that all except one have contracted out either entire, or 
large parts of the WSP function. DMs that are WSAs only have outsourced the function to 
LMs and Water Boards in the districts. A consequence of this is that DMs have become 
largely grant-funded institutions as a result of the fact that only 34 percent are performing a 
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function that raises income through fees. The end result is that the majority of DMs are not 
performing their statutory functions. There seems to be little value-add for most DMs.  
3.5 Critique of Two-Tier System 
3.5.1 Introduction  
This section will discuss some of the main critiques of the two-tier system of local 
government in South Africa. It has been established that the majority of DMs are not 
performing their statutory functions. DMs are plagued with political conflict between as well 
as within parties. This section will discuss issues such as DMs not performing functions, poor 
service delivery, duplication, failure to redistribute, lack of accountability and political 
conflict and will conclude with a brief summary. 
3.5.2 DMs are not performing their statutory functions 
Section 84(1) of the Structures Act states that DMs are required to perform 12 functions but 
excluding those related to finance and preparation of the IDP. Steytler asserted that generally 
DMs only perform half of their statutory functions.
73
 From a total of 44 DMs 21 are WSAs, 
which leaves 23 that are not performing the water services function. Of the 21 WSAs only 15 
(34 percent) are actually performing the function and of that 15 most of them have contracted 
out the function either in part or in full. DMs do not perform the electricity function. The 
MDB Capacity Assessment Report for 2008/9 provides us with a breakdown of functions 
performed:
74
 
 20 percent of districts do 3 or less functions; 
 57 percent of districts do between 4 and 6 functions; 
 20 percent of districts do between 7 and 9 functions; 
 Only 2 districts do more than 9 functions. 
The MDB 2009 Report indicates that 76 percent of DMs are performing less than 50 percent 
of the statutory functions and only 2 DMs are performing more than 75 percent of their 
functions.  Based on this breakdown we can see that DMs are not performing their statutory 
functions as provided for in section 84(1) of the Structures Act. Steytler and Jordan noted that 
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the vision of strong DMs has not materialised as LMs are still dominant in large parts of the 
country; DMs are doing little by way of service delivery with the exception of those 
performing the water services function.
75
  
3.5.3 Poor Service Delivery  
DMs have been criticised for poor service delivery which has been attributed to (i) a lack of 
clarity and (ii) the continuous shifting of functions. Steytler and Jordan noted that one of the 
main causes of unproductive relations between DMs and LMs is the lack of clarity in the 
division of powers and functions.
76
 They noted further that uncertainty related to the scope 
and meaning of section 84(1) of the Structures Act contains at least three kinds of 
uncertainty:
77
 
(i) The distinction between district and local matters;  
(ii) The broad definition of some functions; and 
(iii) The over-inclusiveness of some district powers. 
 
Steytler and Jordan noted the MDBs suggestion that local government functions be divided 
into three categories: district, shared and local. Some functions apply only to DMs or LMs 
but there are multiple functional areas where both DMs and LMs may operate.
78
 The problem 
is most evident in shared functions, which are areas where both DMs and LMs share 
functional competence. Examples of these would be local tourism, municipal planning and 
municipal roads. Mlokoti shared this view in stating that the lack of clarity and the way in 
which powers and functions are divided creates much confusion.
79
 Ultimately, the lack of 
certainty regarding who is responsible for the function results in both tiers holding back on 
delivering the service.
80
 Atkinson stated that as a result of the confusion created by this lack 
of clarity the developmental focus of local government became distorted, in so far as which 
would be the primary developmental tier.
81
 She stated further that the outcome of this 
confusion resulted in relationships being maintained on an ad hoc basis, influenced along 
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party dynamics and personalities, and that relationships have either developed constructively 
or deteriorated into rivalry and suspicion.
82
  
The Structures Act in section 84(3)(a) allows the Minister to shift functions between DMs 
and LMs through the process of authorisation and the MEC in section 85(1) through the 
process of adjustment.
83
 Mlokoti stated that the processes of authorisation and adjustment 
create confusion about who is responsible for executing a function.
84
 He stated further that 
more tension arises since the shift in function may affect the revenue base of a municipality, 
which means that municipalities have difficulties setting their budgets. Atkinson pointed out 
that this uncertainty had four consequences: (i) budgeting and planning and finalisation of 
organograms become difficult; (ii) delay in authorisation may result in low morale, job 
insecurity and resignations; (iii) handing over of schemes becomes difficult due to 
uncertainty as to who is authorised to manage such schemes; and (iv) for the sake of 
continuity a municipality will continue to deliver a service after the function has been 
shifted.
85
 This refers to unfunded mandates that describe the practice of performing a function 
on behalf of another organ of state, which the latter does not fund. Some municipalities 
continued to perform the function after it was reallocated based on their constitutional duty to 
provide an uninterrupted service even without receiving the funding for it.
86
  
 3.5.4 Duplication 
One of the consequences of a lack of clarity is duplication, which happens when both tiers 
provide the same service. Duplication occurs often as a result of competition for resources or 
political manoeuvring, which leads to waste of scarce resources.
87
 Steytler and Jordan noted 
that in some cases the shifting of functions has resulted in the duplication of services.
88
 They 
added by citing an example from Mangaung where the Municipal Manager stated that if a 
local municipality advertises economic development the district does the same. Mlokoti cited 
jurisdictional tensions and contestation between municipalities as a cause of unnecessary 
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duplication of services and wastage of resources and that these tensions are most evident in 
DMs that have secondary cities in their jurisdictions.
89
  
3.5.5 Failure to redistribute 
Section 84(1)(o) of the Structures Act states that one of the main functions of DMs is the 
‘receipt, allocation and, if applicable, the distribution of grants made to the district 
municipality’. In fact, this is one of the main non-assignable functions of a DM. DMs were 
charged with redistributing grant funding and the bureaucratic handwringing created as a 
result of being compelled to divide funds vertically and horizontally between two tiers of 
government did little to advance principles of modern financial management.
90
 Steytler and 
Baatjies noted that one of the key objectives of DMs was to redistribute resources from 
economically stronger municipalities to weaker municipalities in the area.
91
 DMs were able 
to perform this redistributive function to a limited degree through revenue collected from 
RSC levies. Metros collected two-thirds of the total RSC levies, which amounted to 7 percent 
of their total revenue; whereas DMs collected the remaining third of the RSC levy income 
and it accounted for 34 percent of their income.
92
 This gives an indication that DMs were 
more dependent on income generated from the RSC levies. It allowed them to cross-subsidise 
weaker LMs by transferring funds collected from economically stronger municipalities. 
Mlokoti added that this financial muscle allowed DMs to fund and influence the prioritisation 
of projects and easily determine the agenda for intergovernmental forums.
93
   
According to Palmer the scrapping of the RSC levies and the fact that less than half of DMs 
actually raise revenue through tariffs for services has left districts largely grant-funded 
institutions, reliant on transfers for 90 percent of their revenue.
94
 He asserted further that the 
role and function of DMs, and their impact on development, is strongly influenced by the 
way DMs are financed. This is because the way in which finance is applied dictates the level 
of impact institutions have on development, in relation to their allocated functions. Mlokoti 
quoted the maxim that ‘capacity defines the potential for development’ because without this 
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financial muscle DMs are no longer able to fund and influence the prioritisation and 
implementation of the IDPs.
95
 The scrapping of the RSC levies therefore had an extended 
effect in that not only has it made DMs grant-dependent institutions; it has also weakened the 
planning and coordinating function of DMs.  
3.5.6 Accountability 
The lack of clarity regarding responsibility for a function creates uncertainty for consumers 
who are unsure who to hold accountable for poor service delivery. It also enables government 
institutions to ‘pass the buck’ and so avoid taking responsibility.96 The main argument 
levelled at DMs when the four main functions were shifted was the fact that LMs, being the 
last link in the service delivery chain and having first contact with end-users, bears the brunt 
of consumer dissatisfaction. DMs have no wards they are responsible for and therefore have 
no constituencies they have to account to. If these councillors had no direct responsibility to 
resident voters they did not have to include them in important decisions around issues such as 
water and sanitation. Transferring the functions to DMs meant that accountability was 
separated from the institution performing the function and thus negated principles of 
accountable and democratic government. The 40 percent proportional representative (PR) 
councillors are too far removed from residents in the district who vote for them because they 
have no direct responsibility to voters in constituencies. The 60 percent indirectly elected 
councillors who are appointees of LMs played little role in the running of DMs and therefore 
played little or no accountability role.
97
  
3.5.7 DMs and LMs locked in political contestation 
Steytler and Jordan argued that ‘having two political structures that must cooperate on 
numerous matters sets the stage for political contestation’.98 Baatjies added that “district 
municipalities have been known to be sites of fierce political contestations”.99 He argued that 
this is due to alignment in the council being according to political party allegiance and that 
even when there is single party dominance intra-party contestation has also been present. Due 
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to the hierarchical nature of political parties, more senior members are deployed to DMs and 
this plays itself out in council, where more senior members assume their party seniority 
carries over and they are the ‘big brothers’ of more junior members from the local 
councils.
100
 This results in LMs withdrawing from the DMs and makes cooperation difficult. 
It was assumed that the 60:40 ratio of appointed and elected officials on district councils 
would result in the appointed officials dominating the councils. This did not materialise as the 
councillors were uncertain of their roles, whether they were representing their local 
constituents or representing district interests.   
3.5.8 Concluding remarks 
The primary critique levelled at the two-tier system of local government is the fact that most 
DMs to varying degrees are generally not performing their statutory functions. This is a 
significant critique because the fundamental purpose of local government is the delivery of 
services to communities. When DMs and LMs are performing functions poorly they are 
doing so largely because of uncertainty around powers and functions. This leads to a waste of 
scarce resources due to duplication of services. DMs do not play a redistributive role as they 
have lost a major portion of their income through the scrapping of the RSC levies. The 
system of directly elected and appointed officials does not tie in with principles of 
participatory governance. Inter and intra party political conflict has meant that the focus 
shifted from serving communities to political manoeuvring. The main critiques thus serve to 
highlight the fact that the two-tier system is hamstrung, in some cases severely, and that this 
leaves the system ripe for reform. The only remaining question to consider is which reform 
path would come closest to delivering the desired outcomes.    
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Chapter Four:  Policy debate, proposals and resolutions  
 4.1    Introduction  
This chapter will sketch the background to the policy debate around local government reform. 
It will look at what the proposals were and then trace how the ANC have developed them. 
This is followed by a detailed discussion of the actual proposals. The ANC is not considering 
total abolition of the two-tier system of local government; what they are considering is 
restructuring of the two-tier system which would have a lesser impact if strong LMs are 
removed from the DMs.    
4.2  Background to policy debate 
The debate on the reform of the two-tier system has been on-going ever since its inception in 
2000. The first concrete analysis of the challenges facing local government was conducted by 
the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Local Government early in 2003.
101
 Their analysis 
culminated in a comprehensive report that examined all aspects of local government 
transformation. Steytler noted that the ‘Committee’s analysis of the challenges facing local 
government is penetrating and its suggestions are valuable’.102 The Committee stated: ‘Given 
that the new local government system is little more than 2 years old and taking into account 
the magnitude of the transformation, municipalities have progressed well in establishing 
single administrations.’103 Two key points the Committee made with regard to the two-tier 
system was that the (i) biggest challenge appeared to be clarity on the division of powers and 
functions, and (ii) unproductive and often unsatisfactory relations between LMs and DMs.
104
  
The Committee found that relations between DMs and LMs vary from ‘cordial and co-
operative to conflictual and unproductive’ and that the larger LMs questioned the relevance 
of DMs
105
 and suggested that DMs are not necessary in large urban areas.
106
 The Committee 
acknowledged that there were bound to be ‘teething problems’ as the new system was only 
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two years old and held the view that difficulties were to be expected in the early 
implementation phase and that the difficulties did not detract from the overall usefulness of 
the two-tier system.
107
  
According to Steytler and Jordan in 2006 the same problems still persisted with the two-tier 
system and arguably worsened: role clarification was still a significant problem and having 
two separate autonomous political structures having to cooperate on various matters set the 
stage for political contestation.
108
  
 4.2.1 What have been suggested policy options? 
The debate on the future of DMs has seen the emergence of three broad policy options, with a 
variation on one option. First, abolition of the two-tier system, with a variation on abolition of 
either DMs or LMs. Second, retaining the status quo and strengthening the capacity of DMs. 
Third, creating urban stand-alone municipalities while retaining DMs in rural areas. Steytler 
and Baatjies assert that any options should be assessed within the normative framework of 
developmental local government by assessing which option would come closest to achieving 
this constitutional objective.
109
 It should be self-evident that the development of any such 
policy must be commanded by this constitutional objective. However, this objective must 
never override the necessity to factor current realities into any type of decision-making 
regarding policy reform.   
Abolition of DMs (single-tier) 
Atkinson held the view that there was no doubting the importance of DMs, ‘[h]owever, there 
was no intrinsic reason why DMs should be autonomous, elected, democratic bodies.’110 She 
held further that the most appropriate role for DMs was as field offices of provincial 
governments and stated that this would, amongst others, strengthen the effect of provincial 
governments; promote inter-sectoral collaboration; remove political jockeying and remove 
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expenditure on councillors.
111
 Atkinson was thus in favour of abolition by re-establishing 
DMs as administrative extensions of provincial governments, with LMs remaining.   
Baatjies held a different view in relation to reform of the two-tier system of local 
government.
112
 Whereas Atkinson
113
 wanted to see DMs completely depoliticised, Baatjies 
held a more pragmatic view in relation to reform of district councils. However, one of the 
options put forward by Baatjies entailed abolition of DMs as it suggested removing the 
political structure of DMs by establishing multi-jurisdictional entities with LMs as joint 
shareholders.
114
 He explains that multi-jurisdictional entities would be purely business 
entities aimed at combining the strength and capacity of LMs, with emphasis on attracting 
skills and fostering a culture of professionalism within the district.
115
  
Steytler and Baatjies identified the failure of DMs to fulfil their basic functions as the 
primary basis on which arguments for abolition were based and identified five arguments.
116
 
First, one of the main objectives of DMs was the redistribution of resources but that this 
hardly materialised and was eliminated by the scrapping of the RSC levy. They also 
questioned whether DMs, relying solely on transfers and consisting of between two and five 
LMs were the best option for distributing funds, or would the province be better placed to do 
it. Second, the principle of subsidiarity dictates that the level of government closest to the 
area of impact should be responsible for the delivery of the service. Therefore LMs should 
provide services to end-users and where they lack capacity it should be built up by the 
provinces. Third, the creation of a two-tier system of local government was extremely costly 
in terms of structure and personnel. Fourth, DMs are hardly providing any services in urban 
areas. Fifth, South Africa does not have enough LMs to make the two-tier system viable. 
117
  
Steytler and Baatjies provide three main reasons why the wholesale scrapping of the two-tier 
system may not be a wise choice.
118
 First, based on the enormous financial and human 
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resources that have gone into DMs it would be a huge waste to scrap DMs, in addition to it 
being very disruptive of local governance and service delivery. Second, DMs have 
contributed to developmental local government in rural areas. Bulk supply of services enables 
DMs to maximise socio-economic development and their coordinating function can lead to 
better integrated development planning. Third, DMs are performing a supporting role in 
weaker LMs.   
Strengthening of DMs (retain status quo) 
Similar to findings of the Portfolio Committee Report on the Study Tour of Municipalities in 
2003, supporters of the two-tier system held the view that it was too early to review the 
relevance of DMs and that the best option to resolve the problems was to capacitate them 
fully.
119
 The MDB recommended a reversal of the shifting of the current functions to LMs, 
which would see DMs responsible for performing the full functions.
120
 According to Steytler 
and Baatjies this view asserts the inherent worth of the basic objectives of DMs (i.e.) 
coordinating development planning, supporting weaker municipalities and providing services 
to end-users in LMs that lack capacity.
121
  
Baatjies put forward options that called for reform of the functioning of district councils, i.e.; 
increasing local leadership on district councils by ensuring the mandatory election of local 
councillors to district leadership positions; doing away with PR councillors by composing 
district councils only of indirectly elected members.
122
 
Arguably, strengthening the capacity of DMs does not really change anything. It is not 
changing the structure of DMs. All it will do is strengthen DMs without addressing the 
fundamental issues. Steytler and Baatjies question the wisdom of making DMs full service 
providers for end-users as it does not address the fundamental misalignment of roles between 
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secondary cities and DMs and will not only duplicate administration but also intensify 
conflicts between DMs and LMs.
123
 
Abolition of LMs (single-tier) 
This option is suggested by Baatjies and entails establishing the district council as a single 
local authority by absorbing the LMs into DMs as independent entities, which does away 
with LMs as a separate, constitutionally entrenched category of local government.
124
 The 
LMs effectively become sub-councils of the DMs. This is similar to what happens with 
metros and their sub-councils.  
This model results in district-wide single-tier government with all the powers and functions 
to deliver all local and district services. The single-tier authority will not perform all 
functions; the sub-councils would provide some services subject to them having the necessary 
capacity. One of the arguments in favour of this model is familiar; capacity can be more 
efficiently strengthened at district level than at local level. Some of the arguments against this 
model is that it will create more distance between local government and the community; it 
would require a major redrafting of boundaries and wards and will require a reduction in 
councillors.
125
   
Establishing urban stand-alone municipalities – DMs in rural areas only 
While good arguments are made for retaining the two-tier system, the fact that DMs perform 
no real functions in larger urban areas raises a serious question: would single-tier 
municipalities be the most suitable form of government in larger urban areas? Steytler and 
Baatjies answer in the affirmative by stating that single-tier systems are better suited to deal 
with the dual challenges of economic development and poverty alleviation as there is legal 
certainty in role-clarification, which will eliminate turf battles, it reduces transaction costs 
and duplication, it ensures accountability and streamlines decision-making and the flow of 
funding.
126
 They therefore recommend that the most appropriate response to the debate on 
DMs is to redefine their mandate and confine their application to non-urban areas.
127
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Steytler asserted that the focus of the current debate on DMs should be on whether the 
challenges of urbanisation would be better met by single-tier local government and that there 
is a need for specialist, focused municipal government in urban areas.
128
 He stated further that 
such policy is underpinned by the distinction between category A and B municipalities.
129
 
Current practice indicates that DMs are mostly performing functions in non-urban areas and 
it is here that DMs can contribute and build developmental local government as (i) district-
wide planning and integration of services makes scarce resources go further; (ii) providing 
bulk services develops economies of scale and makes rural government more feasible; and 
(iii) weaker or under-capacitated LMs are found primarily in the rural areas which is where 
planning and support functions find its best application.
130
  
4.3 ANC policy development on local government reform 
The ANC as the major governing party has been wrestling with the issue of district and local 
government since its inception and its policy decisions will be the significant driver of local 
government reform. The ANC subsequently developed a discussion paper that include 
recommendations for the reform of the two-tier system of local government. 
 4.3.1 2007 Discussion Document on Legislature and Governance  
The March 2007 ANC Discussion Document on Legislature and Governance for a National 
Democratic Society
131
 said very little about local government reform. The policy document 
alluded to local government reform within the context of the reform of provincial 
government. The most said regarding local government reform was the ANC recommending 
a comprehensive review of the two-tier system of local government. The importance of the 
2007 policy discussion document was that it raised the possibility of the abolition of 
provinces. This could have had a major impact on DMs as they could then have performed 
some of the functions of provinces. Steytler and Baatjies stated that the strengthening of DMs 
received support in the context of the debate on the future of provinces and that the 
disestablishment of provinces could have seen the transfer of some functions to DMs and 
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metros as the next level of government.
132
 The ANC at its December 2007 National 
Conference in Polokwane made no decisions on provinces or local government but resolved 
to hold a comprehensive review of the local government system, including the White Paper, 
and to hold a summit on provincial and local government reform.
133
 
4.3.2 2010 ANC Summit on Provincial and Local Government Reform 
The ANC 2010 Summit on Provincial and Local Government Reform
134
 was much more 
comprehensive in its assessment of local government and in its recommendations for possible 
reform. On the Summit’s assessment of the two-tier system it stated that the vision for DMs 
was that of coordinating and redistributing and that the ANC always held the view that local 
government should play an active role in the equitable distribution of resources.
135
 There was 
recognition by the ANC that various policy shifts undermined the original vision for DMs 
and that this made DMs largely non-functional.
136
 First, the Structures Amendment Act of 
2000 made DMs direct service providers for the four key functions of water, electricity, 
sanitation and health; second, the 2005 IGRF Act
137
 created district intergovernmental forums 
to facilitate cooperative relations between DMs and LMs; third, the scrapping of the RSC 
levies in 2006 by NT fundamentally changed the revenue structure of DMs.
138
 The ANC 
stated further that in addition to the above-mentioned policy shifts the increase in the number 
of LMs taking over district functions not only indicated that DMs were not performing their 
statutory functions, it also undermined governance by increasing tensions between DMs and 
LMs.
139
   
There were proposed options that emerged from the 2010 Summit:
140
 The first three options 
deal with abolition and the last option deals with retention and reform of the two-tier system: 
 Abolition of the two-tier system 
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 Absorbing DMs into provinces and creating a single tier 
 Retaining DMs as shared administrative and service centres for LMs 
  
 Retaining DMs only in certain areas 
The outcome of the 2010 Summit as it relates to local government reform indicated that the 
ANC was giving serious thought to reform and to finding an appropriate policy direction. 
There was recognition within the ANC that local government faced significant problems in 
areas of capacity, service delivery, planning and budgeting and that review of the system was 
needed. The ANC recognised the importance of adhering to the time frames and stated that 
the policy process, while it must be conclusive, must be concluded by June 2012. The 
Summit also stated that there would be a Commission established to conduct an enquiry into 
the review process to ensure accuracy, transparency and inclusivity, but this never 
materialised.
141
 Basically, the 2010 Summit saw the emergence of two options, abolition, and 
retention only in certain areas. Abolition of DMs by absorbing them into provinces with 
district functions assigned to provinces or LMs, creating single-tier government with LMs 
remaining. Retaining of DMs as shared administrative and service centres for LMs, leaving 
the DMs remaining, but as depoliticised multi-jurisdictional entities. A new emerging option 
was that of retaining DMs only in certain areas. This option would entail retaining DMs 
where they are providing service functions.  
 4.3.3 2012 Policy Document on Legislature and Governance 
One of the stated purposes of the 2010 Summit was “to initiate an inclusive process and 
thorough debate within the organisation on changes required to provincial and local 
government, in order to give effect to the principles of the developmental state”.142 In its 
overview of the local government system the March 2012 ANC Policy Document on 
Legislature and Governance built on decisions taken at the 2010 Summit and stated that 
municipalities differ from each other in various ways and that this had an impact on the type 
of services required and the level of services municipalities are able to perform.
143
 There was 
acknowledgement that local government was critical to the efficient delivery of services and 
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was also the most challenged sphere of government.
144
 This lack of proper service is more 
pronounced in rural areas. These municipalities are plagued by institutional weaknesses that 
render them unable to deliver on even their basic service delivery mandate.  
There were three main proposals mentioned in the policy document:
145
 
 Leave the system as it is and strengthen the planning, coordination and support 
functions. 
 Abolish the two-tier system by absorbing DMs into national or provincial 
administration with the LMs becoming stand-alone municipalities. 
 Removing strong LMs from DMs. 
 
This last option seemed to be the favoured one as it called for a more differentiated model of 
the two-tier system. The implementation of such a differentiated model would see strong 
LMs removed from DMs and the policy document acknowledged that creating a new type of 
category A municipality widens the scope for differentiation and allows DMs to focus on 
municipalities that are under-capacitated.
146
 Following the development trajectory of the 
proposed policy reform shows us how initially in 2007 the ANC limited the discussion of 
local government reform to a comprehensive review. In 2010 they were more comprehensive 
in their assessment of local government and the two-tier system and produced various options 
for consideration. These options were debated at the June 2012 ANC National Policy 
Conference at Gallagher Estate in Gauteng.  
4.4 2012 Policy Conference Resolutions  
One of the guiding principles of the development of the policy process as stated in the 2010 
Summit was that prolonged uncertainty was not conducive to effective service delivery. Even 
though analysis must be inclusive and outcomes evidence-based it is crucial to adhere to 
given timeframes and that given the long legislative lead time the policy process should be 
finalised by June 2012.
147
 There is a fluidity that ties together the development of the policy 
process. In 2007 the ANC resolved to undertake a comprehensive review of the architecture 
of government structure, how it impacts on service delivery and committed to holding a 
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summit on provincial and local government. In 2010 the ANC held a summit on provincial 
and local government where various proposals emerged and the ANC resolved to have the 
policy process completed by 2012. At the June 2012 policy conference the ANC debated the 
options and agreed that abolition was not viable. The ANC favoured structural reform of the 
two-tier system
148
 and resolved that ‘[s]trong local municipalities should not be located in 
[d]istricts’.149 Based on policy recommendations the ANC are not keen on maintaining the 
status quo as they see no advantages to retaining the current two-tier system. Abolishing the 
two-tier system may also not be a viable option because of the large amount of resources 
(human and financial) already invested in it and because DMs are still performing a function 
in rural areas.  
4.5 Likely policy option  
4.5.1 ‘Strong’ locals (stand-alone A2s) 
The policy option that strong LMs should not be located within DMs means removing strong 
LMs from the DMs. This option structurally changes the architecture of the two-tier system. 
This means that a new form of category A municipality would have to be established because 
these LMs would become stand-alone municipalities. An important factor is the definition 
that will distinguish strong LMs. LMs considered to be strong would not match the definition 
of metros as defined in the Structures Act. It is not a constitutional definition and 
institutionalising the policy reform without amending the Constitution is the preferred option. 
These strong LMs would not meet criteria for metros, which leave one of two options (i) 
abandoning or changing the current definition of metros, or (ii) adding a definition for urban 
LMs. The main question therefore is: how does one define ‘strong’ LMs? 
 4.5.2 B1s 
There are various indicators used by government to differentiate between LMs. The MDB in 
its Capacity Assessment Report 2006/07 referred to a report prepared for NT in 2004 that 
used population size, percentage urban formal housing, percentage of households with 
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adequate water, revenue less subsidies per household per month, and household income 
profile as criteria to classify municipalities and it is this NT report that placed LMs into four 
sub-categories (B1, B2, B3 and B4) as reflected in table 1 below.
150
 
TABLE 1: Reflects the sub-categories distinguishing between LMs as first used by NT and 
the MDB. 
 
Source: MDB Capacity Assessment Report 2006/07. 
These sub-categories were first used by NT and the MDB and draw a distinction between 
LMs. They were developed as an acknowledgement that municipalities have varying degrees 
of capacity across factors such as fiscal capacity, revenue base, skills, settlement patterns and 
population. Based on the criteria LMs were classified into the various sub-categories. From a 
revenue perspective B2s may be fairly consolidated by having a large town as core, which 
makes them relatively sustainable. It is the B3s and B4s that are more vulnerable as they have 
no large town as core; they have smaller populations and weak revenue bases, which make 
them more susceptible to challenges around sustainability because they are situated in mainly 
rural areas with weak economies which make it harder to attract scarce skills to such areas. In 
this sub-categorisation B1s are of specific relevance because it represents most secondary 
cities that have large population numbers, large budgets, fairly consolidated revenue bases 
and potential to grow their economies.  
 4.5.3 Secondary Cities 
There is no official list of secondary cities in South Africa. NT has adopted a list that named 
22 secondary cities based on population size and growth, size and growth potential of the 
economy (Gross Value Add per Region), size of the municipal budget, assignment of human 
settlements and public transport functions, assignment of intergovernmental transfers and 
geographic spread.
151
 NT’s Cities Support Programme identified 22 South African cities that 
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exhibit consistent economic growth and human settlement patterns and recognised the need to 
develop cities that are responsive to rapid urbanisation.
152
 The strategic aim of the document 
is the linkage between the intergovernmental framework, management of the built 
environment and capacity of cities.
153
 These 22 cities have been selected to be part of NT’s 
programme to strengthen these linkages and build capacity. NT estimates that about 62 
percent of the population live in urban areas and that South African cities (primary and 
secondary) contribute 78 percent of economic activity and are growing faster than the 
national economy.
154
 Cities are thus the main centres of growth and development. Of the 22 
secondary cities 19 are listed by NT as B1s. Three secondary cities have been included in the 
list; two that are B2s (Mafikeng and Khara Hais LMs) and one B3 (Lephalale LM).  
4.5.4 Definition of ‘strong’ LM 
Two categorisations will be used in formulating a definition for strong LMs.  
1. The categorisation of B1s because they have large populations, budgets and 
economic output, which are your main indicators.  
2. The categorisation of secondary cities because they exhibit similar characteristics. Of 
the 22, two B2s have been included. I have however excluded the one B3 LM. The 
remaining 19 are all B1s.  
The B2s have been included because they exhibit significant/similar population numbers, 
budgets and GVA-R in comparison to the other 19 B1s. Lephalale LM has been excluded 
because it does not satisfy the definition of a strong LM as it is a B3 municipality. The other 
two B2 LMs show a dominance pattern which Lephalale does not. Lephalale was included in 
NT’s Cities Support Programme based on its growth potential over the long term. With 
Ellisras as its core town, Lephalale LM represents only 14 percent of the DM population and 
10 percent of the DM GVA.  It does not fit the mould of a strong LM. Therefore, my sample 
consists of 21 of the 22 secondary cities as listed by the SACN’s 2012 Cities Network Report 
and NT’s 2012 Cities Support Programme. 
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Table 2 represents strong LMs defined as the 21 secondary cities; there is no hierarchy or 
ranking. B1s are listed per major town and district. 
TABLE 2: B1s (secondary cities) reflecting major towns and DMs.   
 
Sources: Cities Network Report 2012. 
The SA Cities Network Report
155
 has adopted the list and suggested adding more 
comprehensive indicators in determining features a town should possess to qualify as a 
secondary city. Indicators such as educational profile, labour profile and municipal 
performance are listed within a set of indicators to be used in addition to those used by NT 
and MDB. These are the kinds of indicators that should influence the decision on a definition 
for the new category As. Ideally we would have more than one level of category A (e.g. A1 
and A2) and the definition would establish secondary cities as stand-alone municipalities as 
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 South African Cities Network Background Report (2012) Secondary Cities in South Africa: The start of a  
     conversation 19. Available at: 
     http://led.co.za/sites/led.co.za/files/cabinet/orgname-raw/document/2012/cities_backg_report_2012.pdf  
     (Accessed 13/10/2012).    
B1 MAJOR TOWN DISTRICT
1 Matjhabeng Welkom Lejweleputswa
2 Emfuleni Vereeniging Sedibeng
3 Mogale City Krugersdorp West Rand
4 Msunduzi PietermaritzburgUmgungundlovu
5 Newcastle Newcastle Amajuba
6 Umhlathuze Richards Bay Uthungulu
7 Polokwane Pietersburg Capricorn
8 Emalahleni Witbank Nkangala
9 Govan Mbeki Secunda Gert Sibande
10 Mbombela Nelspruit Ehlanzeni
11 Steve Tshwete Middelburg Nkangala
12 City of Matlosana Klerksdorp Dr Kenneth Kaunda
13 Madibeng Brits Bojanala
14 Mafikeng Mafikeng Ngaka Modiri Molema
15 Rustenburg Rustenburg Bojanala
16 Tlokwe Potchefstroom Dr Kenneth Kaunda
17 Khara Hais Upington Siyanda
18 Sol Plaatje Kimberley Frances Baard
19 Drakenstein Paarl Cape Winelands
20 George George Eden
21 Stellenbosch Stellenbosch Cape Winelands
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the next level of urban concentrations. The reason a new definition would be needed is 
because the current definition is too restrictive in terms of its criteria for stand-alone 
municipalities (metros). Secondary cities would be hard-pressed to meet the narrow criteria. 
One of the primary indicators must be financial sustainability; these new municipalities must 
be able to sustain the bulk of their operational and capital expenditure from own revenue. 
They must have the potential to progressively increase revenue streams. Secondary cities 
dominate contemporary debate around development issues because they are recording the 
fastest population and economic growth, so there is a strong case to be made for them to be 
stand-alone municipalities.
156
 When the ANC policy recommendations talk of removing 
strong LMs from DMs it means establishing B1s as stand-alone municipalities. Established 
practice indicates that DMs perform hardly any functions in B1s therefore; this will have little 
if any impact on B1s. Removing secondary cities from DMs may be the most viable option 
for reform of the two-tier system.  
Secondary cities are important because they are urban centres for people to live and work in, 
which relieves pressure on the traditional large cities.
157
 This is significant in the South 
African context as skewed settlement patterns meant that the bulk of economic activity and 
migration occurred in just a few cities. Secondary cities are considered to have the potential 
to kick-start economic development in surrounding areas. It was therefore deemed important 
to promote the development of secondary cities as they were considered important catalysts 
for more balanced and dispersed growth across the country.
158
 Secondary cities should 
receive special consideration within the context of economic development and how policy 
and legislation either facilitate or constrain development objectives because they exhibit the 
most rapid demographic and economic growth.
159
  
B1s, as the next level of urban concentrations, will become A2s, with metros being A1s. B1s 
have sufficient population numbers, with only Khara Hais (B2) that has a population of less 
than one hundred thousand people. They have large budgets with large revenue bases and the 
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added potential to increase their fiscal capacity. Steytler
160
 noted that while large secondary 
cities are financially viable DMs are not because it was impossible to create two levels of 
government that are both financially viable. He noted further that this is because local 
government’s main revenue sources, property rates and trading services, could not be split 
between the two levels.
161
 What has exacerbated the situation is the scrapping of the RSC 
levy by NT as this affected 34 percent of DMs income, and with it, the redistributive function 
of DMs.    
4.6 What are possible outcomes if secondary cities (B1s) are 
removed from DMs?   
 4.6.1 Possible disestablishment of DMs 
One of the more important outcomes that may occur if B1s are removed from DMs is that 
DMs may see large reductions of their population. This is as a result of DMs being 
established around large towns or secondary cities, with secondary cities being the dominant 
LMs. The logic behind this fundamental change was the notion that large towns would 
support poor rural municipalities. The DMs will then have to continue without the B1s after 
they have been removed, which may have a significant impact on DMs. How will this affect 
the viability of the remaining DMs? According to Steytler close to 20 percent of DMs are 
dominated by an LM constituting upwards of 66 percent of the population for the district 
area.
162
 He noted further that more than 10 percent of B1s have more than 50 percent of the 
district population and that in almost 44 percent of DMs one LM has more than a third of the 
population.
163
 Last, he noted that almost three quarters of DMs had one or more dominant B1 
in its area. Therefore, a significant problem may occur as a result of implementing such a 
policy. There are 4 DMs that will have 3 LMs remaining and there are 3 DMs that will have 2 
LMs remaining if the B1s are removed. This means that 7 DMs will have 2 or 3 LMs 
remaining. The MDB has questioned the viability of such DMs with only 2 or 3 LMs as it 
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would be mere duplication of the LMs themselves. A significant problem in terms of its 
knock-on effect could therefore mean the disestablishment of those DMs. Even though 7 
DMs may be disestablished, the rest of the C1s and C2s will remain. The policy only 
proposes the removal of B1s from DMs. It does not propose the disestablishment of DMs.    
 4.6.2 Future reconfiguration of DMs 
Another important consequence that will occur if the policy option of removing strong LMs 
from DMs is implemented is the effect it will have on the contiguity
164
 of DMs. There will be 
5 DMs that will become non-contiguous if the policy is implemented. Of those 5 DMs, 2 will 
also have between 2 and 3 LMs remaining. At the very least, serious consideration will 
therefore have to be given to the 2 DMs that will have between 2 and 3 LMs remaining, in 
addition to becoming non-contiguous, based on removal of the B1.    
4.6.3 C2s – Will they remain as is?  
An important question emerges regarding whether or not weak C2s will retain their water 
services function.  The rationale behind DMs given the water services function was 
straightforward. It could not in all likelihood be given to any other institutions. In the rural 
areas, particularly the former homeland states, there were no municipal structures operating. 
DMs and LMs were established simultaneously and given powers and DMs were allowed to 
continue the water services function. LMs did not have the function to begin with.  It was 
easy to ask DMs to exercise their statutory powers because there were no competing LMs 
with water services and the two-tier system was starting from scratch because no local 
government existed before 2000 in those areas. DMs performing the statutory function could 
then start building capacity and it therefore seemed more appropriate to authorise those newly 
established DMs to perform the function. C2s will therefore retain the water services function 
if B1s are removed from their area as there would be no other LMs with the capacity to do it.  
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 ‘Contiguity’ in this context refers to the sharing of municipal borders.  
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4.7 Concluding remarks 
NT and the MDB have classified strong LMs as equating to B1s. I am equating B1s with 
‘strong’ LMs as I am going to use B1s as my measure, in addition to using 2 secondary cities 
(B2s) identified by NT as ‘strong’ LMs and used by the Cities Network, but discarding one 
(B3). The 21 secondary cities have large budgets, large populations and economic growth 
potential. The preferred ANC policy option appears to be that B1s be removed from the DMs. 
There may be strengthening of the capacity of DMs but that would not really be structural 
reform. However, implementation of this policy recommendation will leave DMs without 
B1s. This highlights important questions. Will DMs be viable without the B1s? There are 7 
DMs that will be left with 2 or 3 remaining LMs. There will also be 5 DMs that will become 
non-contiguous and of the 5 DMs 2 will also have between 2 and 3 LMs remaining. Based on 
MDB policy, this may have the knock-on effect of leading to either the disestablishment of 
DMs who become non-contiguous, are left with 2 or 3 LMs, or both. It is thus more than just 
simply removing strong LMs from DMs as there are various likely impacts to consider within 
which this ANC policy choice must be implemented.  
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Chapter Five: Analysis of the likely impact of the ANC policy 
choice on the current practice of local government relating to 
councillors, political party, services, personnel and finances.  
5.1 Introduction  
What would be the likely impact on the current practice of local government if the ANC 
implemented the policy choice of removing B1s from DMs? How may that impact influence 
the adoption and implementation of the policy choice? Policy reform is influenced by 
conditions that either constrain or open up possibilities. Examining the existing literature on 
districts, there is remarkably little analysis of the conditions that should inform the policy 
choice. The problem is that policy debates on reform are often conducted in the absence of 
empirical research. However, any policy reform cannot occur in a vacuum. The debate on 
policy reform must be informed by empirical information. Policy makers must consider the 
impact of the proposed policy if 21 secondary cities (B1s) are removed from the DMs and 
become stand-alone A2s. This chapter will therefore focus on the impact of removing B1s 
from DMs - the 21 secondary cities or B1s that form part of the ANC policy proposal to 
remove strong LMs from DMs. The key conditions will be: (a) politicians, (b) political party 
structure, (c) services, (d) personnel, and (e) finances.  
5.2 Secondary Cities - from B1s to A2s 
There are vital components of DMs such as total GVA, population and number of LMs that 
will be affected if the ANC implements the policy of removing strong LMs from DMs. DMs 
will see a vast reduction in population numbers and economic activity. Table 3 below shows 
the difference in population numbers and GVA between DMs and LMs and reflects the 
potential reduction DMs could be facing.   
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TABLE 3: DM population, GVA-R, number of LMs, B1, percentage B1 population per DM, 
major town, B1 GVA and percentage B1 GVA per DM. 
 
Sources: Gaffney’s Local Government Yearbook 2011-13. Global Insight 2012. 
The table shows that the B1s have the bulk of the population. This ranges between 25 and 83 
percent for the 21 B1s in the 17 DMs. The B1s also contribute the bulk of the GVA for the 
district. This ranges between 27 and 96 percent. This is experienced more acutely for DMs 
that have two B1s within their area. Nkangala, Bojanala, Dr Kenneth Kaunda and Cape 
Winelands DMs face a possible reduction of 84, 82, 96 and 55 percent respectively in their 
GVA-R. This has further consequences for the configuration of DMs. Removing of the B1s 
from DMs will reduce the number of remaining LMs in the DMs and affect contiguity. There 
are wider policy implications for DMs when B1s are removed from DMs. It will affect the 
number of councillors they need and revenue transfers they receive from NT, that in turn 
affect their finances, which they need to run their administrations. It will also affect personnel 
needed and threaten the vested interest of politicians.     
DM DM POP
DM GVA 
R'000
LMs B1
% B1 
POP/DM MAJOR TOWN
B1 GVA 
R'000
% B1 
GVA/DM 
Lejweleputswa 685 596 15 294 569 5 Matjhabeng 62% Welkom 12 481 829 82%
Sedibeng 946 555 20 241 674 3 Emfuleni 83% Vereeniging 14 740 081 73%
West Rand 887 598 21 710 084 4 Mogale City 40% Krugersdorp 9 914 604 46%
Amajuba 519 849 9 146 030 3 Newcastle 71% Newcastle 7 393 419 81%
Umgungundlovu 1 035 358 22 968 461 7 Msunduzi 59% Pietermaritzburg 17 025 979 74%
Uthungulu 984 040 22 954 447 6 Umhlathuze 36% Richards Bay 9 352 082 41%
Capricorn 1 267 789 26 441 713 5 Polokwane 44% Polokwane 17 787 952 67%
Ehlanzeni 1 555 511 31 170 845 5 Mbombela 33% Nelspruit 20 560 169 66%
Gert Sibande 967 422 34 336 787 7
Govan 
Mbeki 25% Secunda 19 949 096 58%
Nkangala 1 094 708 42 817 913 6 Emalahleni 41% Witbank 19 555 821 84%
Steve 
Tshwete Middelburg 16 204 036
Frances Baard 360 095 12 813 747 4 Sol Plaatje 63% Kimberley 11 155 364 87%
Siyanda 224 987 8 546 146 6 Khara Hais 39% Upington 2 334 071 27%
Bojanala 1 275 712 53 950 951 5 Rustenburg 62% Rustenburg 32 792 742 82%
Madibeng Brits 11 541 111
Kenneth Kaunda 643 210 16 976 378 4
City of
Matlosana 81% Klerksdorp 10 591 304 96%
Tlokwe Potchefstroom 5 730 392
Ngaka Modiri Molema 820 371 14 187 693 5 Mafikeng 34% Mafikeng 8 110 226 57%
Cape Winelands 727 731 23 864 495 5 Drakenstein 50% Paarl 7 367 594 55%
Stellenbosch Stellenbosch 5 791 135
Eden 525 261 18 553 662 7 George 33% George 5 813 902 31%
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5.3 PR Councillors per province and district  
Implementation of the ANC policy choice of removing B1s from DMs may have serious 
implications for district councillors. The 21 B1s are situated in 17 DMs spread across all but 
one province, the EC. The main question is therefore whether the 17 DMs will require the 
same amount of councillors if the ANC policy choice of removing the 21 B1s from those 
DMs is implemented? It is in the impact on councillors that the implementation of the policy 
choice will be most visible. The reason for this is the method used to determine the number of 
councillors per municipality. Section 20(1)(a) of the Structures Act states that the number of 
councillors of a municipality must be determined by using a formula determined by the 
Minister and that the formula must be based on the number of voters per municipality. 
Section 23(2)(a) states that the number of councillors representing LMs in a district council 
must be equal to 60 percent of the number of councillors as determined by section 20(1)(a). 
For example, if a district council has 10 councillors as per section 20(1)(a), 60 percent must 
be indirectly elected councillors from the LMs as per section 23(2)(a). The remaining 40 
percent constitute PR councillors for the district council. If B1s are removed from DMs the 
number of voters in the DM will be reduced. Theoretically, a reduction in the number of 
voters would see a reduction in the number of PR councillors as per section 20(1)(a).  
Table 4 reflects councillor representation per number of voters for the 17 DMs and indicates 
the projected loss of total councillors and then PR councillors per DM. This is based on the 
current number of DM voters per councillor. For example, if a DM has 10 councillors and 
50 000 voters, the ratio is 1: 5000. This is used to determine the number of councillors if the 
B1s are removed from the DMs. The new total number of councillors is then split 60:40 to 
determine the new number of PR councillors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: Councillors (60:40) for the 17 DMs per province and projected loss of 
councillors.  
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Sources: IEC LGE Candidate and Councillor Reports 2012. Gaffney’s Local Government Yearbook 2011-13.
PROV DM B1
DM 
CLLRS
PR 
CLLRS
DM 
VOTERS B1 VOTERS
DM 
VOTERS/D
M CLLR
DM 
VOTERS/D
M CLLR %
DM V'S - 
B1 V'S
% LOSS 
DM V'S - 
B1 V'S 
 DM 
CLLRS 
REM.
 LOSS 
OF DM 
CLLRS 
 % LOSS 
OF DM 
CLLRS 
PR 
CLLRS 
REM.
LOSS 
PR 
CLLRS
%LOSS 
PR 
CLLRS
FS Lejweleputswa Matjhabeng 38 16 311 303 203 593 8 192 3% 107 710 65% 13 25       65% 5 11 67%
GP Sedibeng Emfuleni 48 19 435 154 342 715 9 066 2% 92 439 79% 10 38       79% 4 15 79%
West Rand Mogale City 44 18 396 577 175 799 9 013 2% 220 778 44% 24 20       44% 10 8 46%
KZN Amajuba Newcastle 25 10 201 267 149 136 8 051 4% 52 131 74% 6 19       74% 3 7 74%
uMgungundlovu Msunduzi 45 18 466 279 282 708 10 362 2% 183 571 61% 18 27       61% 7 11 61%
uThungulu Umhlathuze 41 17 414 834 154 544 10 118 2% 260 290 37% 26 15       37% 10 7 39%
LP Capricorn Polokwane 53 21 519 393 239 953 9 800 2% 279 440 46% 29 24       46% 11 10 46%
MP Ehlanzeni Mbombela 69 28 698 974 254 137 10 130 1% 444 837 36% 44 25       36% 18 10 37%
Gert Sibande Govan Mbeki 48 19 444 302 131 576 9 256 2% 312 726 30% 34 14       30% 14 5 29%
Nkangala Emalahleni 59 24 575 039 167 690 9 746 2% 309 286 46% 32 27       46% 13 11 47%
Steve Tshwete 98 063
NC Frances Baard Sol Plaatje 27 10 184 671 121 367 6 840 4% 63 304 66% 9 18       66% 4 6 63%
Siyanda Khara Hais 21 8 113 615 46 956 5 410 5% 66 659 41% 12 9         41% 5 3 38%
NW Bojanala Madibeng 68 27 679 018 203 510 9 986 1% 233 076 66% 23 45       66% 9 18 65%
Rustenburg 242 432
Dr Kenneth Kaunda City of Matlosana 39 16 328 598 184 971 8 426 3% 54 685 83% 6 33       83% 3 13 84%
Tlokwe 88 942
Ngaka Modiri Molema Mafikeng 41 16 356 842 124 092 8 703 2% 232 750 35% 27 14       35% 11 5 33%
WC Cape Winelands Drakenstein 40 16 346 971 115 089 8 674 3% 152 332 56% 18 22       56% 7 9 56%
Stellenbosch 79 550
Eden George 35 15 292 129 90 601 8 347 3% 201 528 31% 24 11       31% 10 5 36%
TOT 17 21 741 298 6 764 966 3 497 424 150 119 3 267 542 356 385     142 156
AVE 44 18 397 939 205 731 8 831 3% 192 208 52% 21 23       53% 8 9 53%
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Removal of B1s from DMs will see a significant reduction in the number of PR councillors in 
district councils. On average the ratio of DM councillor to DM voters is 1: 8831. 
Implementation of the policy will see a loss of 156 PR councillors, at an average reduction of 
53 percent of PR councillors for the 17 DMs. Sedibeng and Dr Kenneth Kaunda DMs will 
see a reduction of 79 and 84 percent respectively in the number of PR councillors. The B1s 
contain the bulk of the voters for the district and if a B1 is removed from a DM so are the 
bulk of the voters.  
Section 20 of the Structures Act allows for some differentiation based on the category of 
municipality and allows the MEC for local government in a province to deviate from the 
numbers as determined by the formula, but only under qualified circumstances. The deviation 
may also not be more than three if the allocated number of councillors is 30 or fewer, or 10 
percent of the allocated number if there are more than 30 councillors as per section 20(4)(a) 
and (b). In terms of any deviation the room to manoeuvre is limited. It is unlikely that the 
Minister will adjust the formula so as to accommodate for the reduction in voters as a means 
to retain councillors as this will mean an increase of PR councillors in all other DMs. In total 
there will be a loss of 156 PR councillors. Will the ANC redeploy their member councillors? 
And if so, where to? 
  5.4 District mayors on regional or provincial political structures  
There are 44 DMs in South Africa and if the less preferred option of absorbing DMs into 
national/provincial government should be implemented those 44 district mayors all stand to 
lose their positions and with it their livelihood. If the preferred option of removing 21 B1s 
from 17 DMs is implemented there may still be casualties amongst the mayors. At the very 
least their fiefdoms will drastically be reduced in size and revenue base. Table 5 reflects the 
mayors of the 17 DMs per province and whether or not those mayors are serving on Regional 
Executive Committees (RECs) or Provincial Executive Committees (PECs) of the ANC, and 
in what capacity. The information was sourced by making telephone calls to the individual 
DMs and speaking either to the mayors or their personal assistants.    
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TABLE 5: Mayors and their position within the ANC (REC and PEC) structures.  
 
 
Rule 21.1 of the ANC constitution states that the National Executive Committee (NEC) will 
supervise the PECs in their division of the province into regions to facilitate more democratic 
and efficient functioning of the ANC. Rule 21.2 states that these regions will be demarcated 
to adhere strictly to district (and metro) boundaries in the province. If these 21 B1s are 
removed from the DMs and become stand-alone municipalities the ANC may have to 
establish 21 new RECs.  
In total 36 mayors from 39 ANC-held DMs (representing 92 percent) are serving on RECs, 
PECs, or both. Of the 36, 15 mayors (representing 41 percent) are Chairpersons of their 
respective RECs. There are also 9 mayors (representing 25 percent) that are members of 
PECs. If the option of removing the 21 B1s from the 17 DMs is implemented it affects 17 
RECs and, by extension, 17 mayors. The 17 DMs constitute 43 percent of the total DMs 
which will have their senior councillors affected. Over one third (35 percent) of the mayors 
are REC Chairpersons. One of the mayors is REC Deputy Chairperson. One mayor is a REC 
Deputy Secretary. Three mayors (18 percent) are ordinary members of the ANC. Five mayors 
(29 percent) are members of the PEC, which is significant because REC Chairpersons and 
PROVINCE DISTRICT MUNICIPALITIES
MAYORS SERVING REGIONAL/PROVINCIAL POLITICAL 
STRUCTURES
FREE STATE Lejweleputswa ANC REC Chairperson ex  officio  PEC member
GAUTENG Sedibeng ANC REC Chairperson ex  officio  PEC member
West Rand ANC REC Chairperson ex  officio  PEC member
KWAZULU NATAL Amajuba ANC REC Deputy Chairperson 
uMgungundlovu ANC PEC member 
uThungulu ANC REC Deputy Secretary
LIMPOPO Capricorn ANC REC Chairperson ex officio  PEC member
MPUMALANGA Ehlanzeni ANC PEC member
Gert Sibande ANC PEC womens league
Nkangala ANC REC member
NORTHERN CAPE Frances Baard ANC PEC member
Siyanda ANC REC Chairperson ex officio  PEC member
NORTH WEST Bojanala ANC REC Chairperson ex officio  PEC member
Dr Kenneth Kaunda ANC PEC member
Ngaka Modiri Molema ANC REC member
WESTERN CAPE Cape Winelands DA member
Eden DA member
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Secretaries are also ex officio members of the PECs as per Rule 19.4 of the ANC Constitution 
as amended 2007. This means that 65 percent of the mayors are members of PECs as per 
Rule 19.4 of the ANC Constitution. These are powerful and influential politicians that may be 
faced with the possibility of having their power base reduced or even wiped out.  
5.5 Services 
DMs have little, if any real presence in the B1s. The secondary cities perform all the main 
functions and also the priority and shared functions. Of the 17 DMs there are 5 C2s, of which 
only 3 are WSAs/WSPs. The other 13 are all C1s. According to Steytler DMs perform almost 
no functions in the B1s; he stated that in the LMs of Buffalo City, Mangaung, Emfuleni and 
Msunduzi the DMs had, before 2011, hardly any presence or impact.
165
 This is confirmed in 
the MDB Capacity Assessment Report 2012 which indicates that B1s are performing almost 
all of the functions, including non-statutory functions.
166
 Therefore, the removal of B1s 
should have little if any impact on DMs in relation to the provision of functions and services.  
5.6 Personnel numbers for 17 DMs per province  
There may be no real impact on personnel because DMs are not active in the B1s. In theory 
the main impact may be financial in relation to affordability. There are over 5 000 personnel 
for the 17 DMs and the services they provide may stay the same. These personnel are 
performing mainly governance, administration, and planning and development functions. The 
question is: where will the money come from to pay the personnel? See next section for 
impact on finances. Table 6 reflects the personnel numbers of the 17 DMS for each province.  
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TABLE 6: Number of personnel employed by 17 affected DMs. 
 
Source: MDB Capacity Assessment Report 2012. 
The 17 DMs employ a considerable number of personnel. The likely impact on over 5000 
people if the policy choice of removing B1s from DMs is approved and implemented will be 
negligible because DMs will still perform the same functions. There will be no reduction in 
personnel because DMs will still perform functions in remaining LMs. Some DMs may be 
disestablished, which will affect senior management personnel. The real problem will be 
financial: whether or not DMs will be able to pay for existing personnel based on the current 
system of local government financing for DMs.  
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5.7 Finances and budgets 
The way in which DMs are funded would result in a significant loss in revenue if the ANC 
policy choice of removing B1s from DMs is implemented. DMs would lose the bulk of their 
revenue base as determined by the existing funding model. There are three main ways 
through which districts are funded: 
 Fees for services rendered; 
 By charging surcharges on tariffs for services they provide; and 
 Transfers:  (i)   Equitable Share (ES), 
                  (ii)  RSC Replacement Grant, and 
                  (iii) Conditional Grants.   
     
It has been established that DMs raise little revenue through fees for services they provide. 
Charging surcharges on fees for services is therefore not a source of revenue for these DMs 
as they provide no real services. What is left are the ES and RSC levy replacement grant. The 
ES is calculated based on the following:
167
 
 The Basic Services component constitutes 92.1 percent of the ES and provides for the 
cost of providing free basic services and municipal health services. The objectives of 
the basic services component are to support poor households; distinguish between 
connector services and alternative service-delivery mechanisms; recognise water, 
sanitation, refuse removal and electricity reticulation as core services; and provide 
municipal health services to all households. The allocation is calculated based on the 
subsidies for the core services, number of households connected/not connected to the 
core services and total number of households.   
 The Development component is dormant.  
 The I-component constitutes 7.9 percent of the ES and subsidises basic municipal 
administrative costs and is determined based on population, councillor and poor 
household numbers.  
 Revenue-raising capacity correction component compensates for variation in revenue-
raising capacity between municipalities by deducting 7 percent of the value of the ES, 
mainly from wealthier municipalities, to subsidise poorer municipalities.  
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 National Treasury (2012a) W1 Explanatory Memorandum to the division of revenue 33. Available at:  
     http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2012/review/Annexure%20W1.pdf   
     (Accessed 2012/10/24).  
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 Correction and stabilisation factor – ensures guarantees in the formula can be met 
and constitutes a small portion of the final ES allocations.   
Table 7 reflects DMs and B1s across provinces per population numbers, budgets, GVA-R per 
DM. It is important to show the differences in population numbers, budgets and GVA 
between DMs and LMs when stating that DMs are going to have large parts of their revenue 
bases affected when B1s become stand-alone municipalities, and the possible knock-on 
effects resulting from that. Looking at Table 3 above it is evident that there is considerable 
overlap with Table 7. This is deliberate. Table 3 serves as a broad picture of population 
numbers and GVA-R of the 17 DMs and 21 B1s. The purpose of this is to give an 
introductory view that familiarises the reader with the argument as it progresses. Table 7 
includes budgets and how these may be affected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7: DMs and B1s disaggregated between population number, budgets and number of 
LMs per DM and number of LMs and population remaining after B1s are been removed.
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Source: Gaffney’s Local Government Yearbook 2011-13. Global Insight 2012.
DMs – B1s
POP.
BUDGET 
R'000 POP.
BUDGET 
R'000 POP.
1 Lejweleputswa 685 596 106 251 15 294 569 Matjhabeng 425 929 1 578 947 12 481 829 259 667 62% 82%
2 Sedibeng 946 555 325 263 20 241 674 Emfuleni 784 276 3 555 193 14 740 081 162 279 83% 73%
3 West Rand 887 598 251 977 21 710 084 Mogale City 352 244 1 472 162 9 914 604 535 354 40% 46%
4 Amajuba 519 849 193 514 9 146 030 Newcastle 369 842 1 235 141 7 393 419 150 007 71% 81%
5 Umgungundlovu 1 035 358 456 546 22 968 461 Msunduzi 614 038 2 684 234 17 025 979 421 320 59% 74%
6 Uthungulu 984 040 574 227 22 954 447 Umhlathuze 349 576 2 019 150 9 352 082 634 464 36% 41%
7 Capricorn 1 267 789 571 812 26 441 713 Polokwane 555 464 2 064 005 17 787 952 712 325 44% 67%
8 Ehlanzeni 1 555 511 192 290 31 170 845 Mbombela 512 622 1 803 591 20 560 169 1 042 889 33% 66%
9 Gert Sibande 967 422 257 677 34 336 787 Govan Mbeki 238 357 1 076 105 19 949 096 729 065 25% 58%
10 Nkangala 1 094 708 317 768 42 817 913 Emalahleni 297 116 1 226 797 19 555 821 644 125 41% 84%
Steve Tshwete 153 467 1 110 135 16 204 036
11 Frances Baard 360 095 104 183 12 813 747 Sol Plaatje 225 083 1 323 103 11 155 364 135 012 63% 87%
12 Siyanda 224 987 95 744 8 546 146 Khara Hais 86 717 400 668 2 334 071 138 270 39% 27%
13 Bojanala 1 275 712 488 633 53 950 951 Rustenburg 415 201 2 330 919 32 792 742 487 698 62% 82%
Madibeng 372 813 983 588 11 541 111
14 Kenneth Kaunda 643 210 168 938 16 976 378 City of Matlosana 385 282 1 740 005 10 591 304 120 255 81% 96%
Tlokwe 137 673 767 034 5 730 392
15 Ngaka Modiri Molema 820 371 531 287 14 187 693 Mafikeng 278 320 461 616 8 110 226 542 051 34% 57%
16 Cape Winelands 727 731 470 063 23 864 495 Drakenstein 224 476 1 396 225 7 367 594 366 194 50% 55%
Stellenbosch 137 061 904 263 5 791 135
17 Eden 525 261 243 277 18 553 662 George 172 536 1 183 706 5 813 902 352 725 33% 31%
TOT 14 521 793 4 798 932 395 975 597 7 088 093 31 316 587 266 192 909 7 433 700
AVE 854 223 282 290 23 292 682 416 947 1 842 152 15 658 406 437 276 50% 65%
B1 GVA R'000 
% LOSS 
DM 
POPDM GVA R'000
B1 % 
GVA/
DM DM
B1DM
B1
  
56 
 
5.7.1 Impact of DMs – B1s on Equitable Share transfer 
Basic Services Component 
The Basic Services component applies to all households. In DMs this includes the population 
of the B1s. The Basic Services component constitutes 92.1 percent of the ES transfer. This is 
a significantly high proportion of the ES allocation. This is because the objective is to 
subsidise the delivery of free basic services to poor households. Therefore, if the population 
of DMs is reduced so is the number of households. On average DMs stand to see a reduction 
of 50 percent of their population if B1s are removed from DMs. For 2 DMs the reduction in 
population is over 80 percent. Considering that the Basic Services component constitutes 
over 90 percent of the ES transfer, removal of B1s from DMs will see an average reduction in 
the ES transfer to DMs of at least half. For DMs that raise very little own revenue this will be 
a significant reduction in finances.   
Institutional Component 
The I-component is significant because it funds the cost of a municipality’s administration 
and is determined by population numbers and number of poor households. It is also 
determined by taking into account the base allocation for each municipality, allocations for 
councillors and number of seats. If B1s are removed from DMs they take with them the bulk 
of the population, councillors and a large portion of poor households. The I-component of the 
ES will now be determined minus the B1 population, councillors and poor households.  
A decrease in the population leads to a decrease in the number of voters, which would lead to 
a decrease in the number of councillors. Removing B1s from DMs results in a decrease in the 
main components used to determine the ES. It will now be determined based on reduced 
councillor, population and poor household numbers. The funding formula cannot be changed 
as it must apply to all municipalities.  
According to Palmer DMs spend about half of their budgets on governance and 
administration activities.
168
 It has been established that removal of B1s from DMs will see a 
reduction of over 50 percent in population and councillors, which means at least half of their 
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budgets may be cut. Theoretically personnel numbers may have to be reduced because the 
DM should have a smaller administration based on the removal of the B1. The DM will be 
unable to fund the same size administration because of a reduction in the I-component of the 
ES. For example, Emfuleni LM has a population of 784 276 and Sedibeng DM has a 
population of 946 555. The removal of the B1 from the DM sees the DM left with a 
population of 162 279. That total constitutes a reduction in population of 83 percent for the 
DM (See Table 7). Voter numbers will be reduced and because voter numbers are used to 
determine councillor numbers there will be a reduction in councillor numbers. For example, 
Sedibeng will see a reduction of 79 percent in councillor numbers (See Table 4). DMs will 
have considerably less money but will be left with the same service delivery obligations and 
the same staff numbers.  
 5.7.2 RSC levy replacement grant 
Based on the current formula it is in the RSC replacement grant that DMs will feel the 
financial effects acutely because it is based on economic activity - business payroll and turn-
over taxes. For example, Dr Kenneth Kaunda DM will see a dramatic reduction in the basis 
for the replacement levy equivalent to the B1s contribution of the regional GVA totalling 96 
percent. The removal of 2 B1s will wipe out the DM’s GVA. The removal of Sol Plaatje LM 
will see a reduction of 87 percent of the GVA contribution of Frances Baard DM. Overall the 
B1s contribution to the GVA of DMs ranges between 27 and 96 percent. There will thus be 
significant impact on DMs financially if B1s are removed from DMs. What this means is that 
in reality the basis for the RSC levy replacement will no longer be valid as the removal of 
B1s from DMs will see a reduction of 65 percent of GVA on average for DMs.   
The Cities Network Report recognises that demographic strength and GVA-R are two 
important indicators of an area’s importance to the national economy. Added to this is the 
size of the municipal budget.
169
 Table 7 shows two distinct patterns: B1s have budgets that 
are considerably larger than that of the DMs. B1s on average contribute the bulk of GVA for 
the district. Take Amajuba DM for example. The B1 contributes over R7b in GVA towards 
the region’s R9b, meaning that the B1 generates the bulk of economic activity in the region. 
                                                 
169
 Cities Report (2012) 14. 
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The situation is similar when comparing the budgets. The total budget for Amajuba DM is 
R193.514m and the total budget for Newcastle LM is R1,235.141b. The budget for the B1 is 
a billion rand more than that of the DM. The budget for the district is roughly one sixth the 
size of the secondary city’s budget. This indicates that practically all of the economic activity 
is concentrated in and around the B1, which is home to almost three quarters of the district 
population. For Amajuba DM losing 71 percent of their population theoretically should result 
in a significant downward adjustment in the ES allocation. It is a similar situation for 
Emfuleni LM in Sedibeng DM. Sedibeng DM has a population of 946 555 and Emfuleni LM 
has a population of 784 276. The B1 municipality constitutes 83 percent of the population for 
the DM. The budgets are also similar, the B1 has a budget of R3,555.193b and the DM has a 
budget of R325.263m. The B1 has a budget that is more than ten times that of the DM.   
 5.7.3 Removal of B1s from DMs: Reconfiguring DMs 
The ANC policy of removing B1s from DMs will have further knock-on consequences for 
DMs. First, there will be some DMs that will have 2 or 3 LMs remaining. Second, there will 
be DMs that will become non-contiguous. In both cases re-demarcation may be required. 
Table 8 reflects DMs and the number of remaining LMs after the B1s have been removed.  
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TABLE 8: LMs remaining in DMs after removing B1s and non-contiguous remaining DMs. 
  
Source: Capacity Assessment Report 2012. 
Numbers of LMs 
In the examples of Newcastle and Emfuleni the DMs only have three LMs in their area. 
Removing the B1s from those DMs mean that the DMs are left with only two remaining 
LMs. In terms of the MDB policy this was the reason Motheo and Metsweding DMs were 
disestablished, as having only two LMs in a district would be nothing more than a duplication 
of the LMs. Therefore, in addition to re-establishing DMs after B1s have been removed there 
may also be further disestablishment of DMs. In total there are 4 DMs that will be left with 3 
LMs remaining and there are 3 DMs that will be left with 2 LMs remaining. Disestablishment 
of at least 3 DMs on this ground is thus on the cards.  
Contiguity of LMs 
If the ANC policy choice of removing B1s from DMs is approved and implemented there 
will be 5 DMs that will become non-contiguous. Of these 5 DMs, Bojanala and Kenneth 
1 Lejweleputswa Matjhabeng 5 4
2 Sedibeng Emfuleni 3 2
3 West Rand Mogale City 4 3
4 Amajuba Newcastle 3 2
5 Umgungundlovu Msunduzi 7 6
6 Uthungulu Umhlathuze 6 5
7 Capricorn Polokwane 5 4 ←
8 Ehlanzeni Mbombela 5 4
9 Gert Sibande Govan Mbeki 7 6
10 Nkangala Emalahleni 6 4 ←
Steve Tshwete
11 Frances Baard Sol Plaatje 4 3
12 Siyanda Khara Hais 6 5
13 Bojanala Rustenburg 5 3 ←
Madibeng
14 Kenneth Kaunda City of Matlosana 4 2 ←
Tlokwe
15 Ngaka Modiri Molema Mafikeng 5 4
16 Cape Winelands Drakenstein 5 3
Stellenbosch
17 Eden George 7 6 ←
NON-
CONTIGUOUSLMsDM B1
DMs-B1s LMs 
REM.
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Kaunda will have 3 and 2 LMs remaining respectively. In LP the removal of Polokwane LM 
from Capricorn DM will see Lepelle-Nkumpi LM separated from the rest of the LMs in the 
district. In MP the removal of Emalahleni LM from Nkangala DM separates the remaining 
LMs from each other. It is the same for Bojanala, Dr Kenneth Kaunda and Eden DMs. The 
example of Bojanala DM is interesting because removal of Madibeng LM from the DM 
isolates Moretele LM from the remaining LMs in the district against the provincial borders of 
LP and GP. Maps 1 and 2 below show the non-contiguity that will occur as a result of the 
policy choice of removing B1s from DMs. 
MAP 1: Map illustrating municipal borders. 
 
Source: MDB Website. 
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MAP 2: Map illustrating municipal borders.
 
Source: MDB Website. 
 
From the above map we can see that the removal of the City of Matlosana and Tlokwe LMs 
clearly separates Ventersdorp and Maquassi LMs from each other. Not only is the DM left 
with only 2 remaining LMs, those LMs are not contiguous. A better option may be to 
incorporate Ventersdorp LM into Bojanala DM and Maquassi LM into Ngaka Modiri 
Molema DM. They may even be absorbed into the newly created A2s.  
5.8 Concluding remarks 
The likely impact of the ANC policy choice of removing B1s from DMs will have significant 
impact on DM councillors. PR councillors will be slashed by half. Overall the number of 
councillors that may lose their positions is not significant but it will affect major politicians 
because 65 percent of the mayors are members of the PECs. There should be no impact on 
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service delivery as DMs are not active in the B1s. As a result, personnel should not be 
affected directly in this way. However, personnel may be affected based on the reduction in 
the budgets of DMs by at least 50 percent. The policy choice will have an impact on DMs as 
it would require a re-configuring of DMs based on both remaining numbers of LMs and the 
split that creates non-contiguous LMs in the DMs.  
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Chapter Six:  Conclusion: The likely impacts of the policy 
option on the practice of DMs and the adoption of the policy.  
6.1   Introduction 
The preferred ANC policy choice for reform of the two-tier system of local government is the 
removal of strong LMs from DMs. The policy choice is likely to have a significant impact on 
the practice of DMs in relation to (a) councillors, (b) political party (ANC), (c) services, (d) 
personnel, and (e) finances. The final question is how the likely impacts will/may influence 
the adoption and implementation of the policy choice. Will the likely impacts on the above-
mentioned factors constrain or facilitate the adoption and implementation of the policy 
choice? The likely impacts will constrain the adoption and implementation of the policy 
choice if it threatens/impacts on vested interests. It will facilitate adoption and 
implementation of the policy choice if it cost-saves and improves service delivery. Any kind 
of policy debate or attempted reform must be based on empirical information. By assessing 
the likely impacts we may determine the policy space for manoeuvre.   
6.2 PR Councillors 
For PR councillors in the 17 DMs adoption and implementation of the policy choice will 
have a significant impact. More than half the number of PR councillors will be slashed. This 
inevitably means a reduction in the number of politicians elected. How significant will the 
problem be? Compared to all PR councillors for the 44 DMs the problem may not be very 
significant because the total loss of councillors will be 24 percent. However, any loss 
may/will lead to resistance against the adoption and implementation of the policy choice. 
Looking at past practice there was a minimal reduction in the number of councillors in 2000 
when 842 TLCs were reduced to 284. Since 2000 there has been no reduction in the number 
of councillors. Full-time councillors earn a salary of between R400,000 and R800,000 all-
inclusive per year and part-time councillors earn between R100,000 and R400,000 depending 
on their municipality’s grade.170 Most if not all of the executive leadership of DMs come 
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from PR councillors. A significant reduction in the numbers of PR councillors in the 17 DMs 
will thus impact on the vested interests of those councillors. This likely impact will need to 
be managed. But what are the options? The options are limited because there is one formula 
used for determining the number of councillors. If the formula is increased it will 
automatically increase councillor numbers for all municipalities. Will these ANC members 
support a policy that will see them lose their positions and with it their livelihoods? Self-
preservation may surface and councillors who stand to lose their positions may lobby against 
any such proposal. The loss of councillors will have a significant impact on vested interests 
and will therefore constrain the adoption and implementation of the policy choice. 
6.3 Political impacts on ANC 
RECs are demarcated to adhere strictly to district and metro municipal boundaries and by 
removing a B1 from the DM the REC may have to be split as the new A2s (similar to metros) 
will get their own RECs. This would necessitate the establishment of 21 new REC’s by 
splitting the 17 DMs. By removing the B1s from DMs the split will dramatically reduce the 
population and economic activity in DMs. This will lead to contestation for control of the 
newly created A2 as the DM will be left with negligible population numbers and resources. 
This contestation will prove problematic as current mayors of the 17 DMs are likely to opt for 
control of the new A2s. This is because the new A2s will have the bulk of the population, 
voters, budget and GVA-R, which may lead to contests with sitting mayors of B1s.  
Mayors for DMs are well remunerated, NT estimates that on average mayors earn a total 
package of R1 179 120 and executive mayors earn a total package of R 1 486 311 per year.
171
 
These mayors are important members of the ANC. Will these mayors support a proposal that 
sees them lose well over a million rand a year in salaries? There will thus be a significant 
impact on vested interests and may constrain the adoption and implementation of the policy 
choice. However, this should not prove to be an insurmountable obstacle.    
                                                                                                                                                        
     Gazette No. 34869) 7. 
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6.4 Services 
There should be no real impact on DM services as DMs are not active in B1s. The removal of 
B1s will thus not have any disruption on service delivery. From a total of 17 DMs 12 are not 
WSAs/WSPs. Of the five remaining C2s, two are WSAs only and three are both 
WSAs/WSPs. This constitutes a small number of DMs and will therefore not have a 
significant impact on water services. It may, however, have a significant positive impact on 
service delivery in the B1s as it would mean a less complex governance regime that a single-
tier municipality provides. 
Steytler noted that single-tier local government is considered the preferred option for large, 
high-density urban populations, which describes current metros, and would be suitable for the 
next level of urban concentrations: creating of new category As by removing secondary cities 
from DMs.
172
 He stated further that a single-tier system would be suitable for this next level 
of urban concentration because it leaves one municipal authority to focus on and specialise in 
developing the local economy and reducing poverty.
173
 Steytler asserted that the underlying 
point the White Paper was making was that local government needed specialist municipalities 
that focus on urban issues such as distribution of resources, strategic land-use planning, 
coordinated public investment in infrastructure and developing a city-wide framework for 
socio-economic development.
174
 This is also the fundamental basis for NT’s Cities Support 
Programme, which has as its main objectives the management of the urban built 
environment, economic development and altering the economic geography of the cities.
175
 
Improving service delivery for B1s may therefore facilitate the adoption and implementation 
of the policy choice.  
6.5 Personnel   
Adoption and implementation of the policy choice will impact on personnel because of 
affordability and finances. As will be seen from the next section there will be a significant 
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reduction in funding to the DMs. Implementation of the policy choice will therefore have cost 
implications because DMs generate little own revenue and receive the bulk of their finances 
through transfers. The adjustment in the transfers to DMs will have a significant impact on 
the finances of DMs. The size of the DMs will be reduced (they will have significantly less 
people) and they will have less financial resources (reduction in transfers). Looking at 
operating expenditure for municipalities, employee costs account for the largest portion of 
operating expenditure, averaging at about 30 percent.
176
 Difficulties may arise in the case of 
Municipal Managers (MM) (and other senior managers). Will reduced DMs be able to afford 
MMs and other personnel? A further problem is the possible disappearance of DMs. In 
addition there are a possible 7 DMs that may be disestablished as a result of the policy choice 
because they will have 2 or 3 LMs remaining. There are also 5 DMs that will become non-
contiguous as a result of the policy choice. Of these 5 DMs, 2 will also have between 2 and 3 
LMs remaining. What happens to the district MM if the local already has one? These likely 
impacts will therefore restrain adoption and implementation of the policy choice because 
there will be resistance to it. People will want to protect their jobs. 
6.6 Finances 
DMs generate very little own revenue. The bulk of funding for DMs comes from national 
transfers. The two main transfers are the ES and RSC replacement. The adoption and 
implementation of the policy choice will have significant impact on DM finances. The ES is 
calculated based on size of the population, councillors, households, their income and whether 
they are serviced or not.
177
 Removing B1s from DMs would reduce these components within 
DMs. Removing B1s from the DMs would have significant financial implications for DMs as 
in most cases the B1s will take the bulk of the revenue base with them. Theoretically, DMs 
should receive less money through the ES from NT if B1s become stand-alone municipalities. 
This should necessitate a review of the fiscal policy for DMs.  
Removal of B1s from the DMs will affect the ES calculation as the I-Component uses 
population and number of poor households in calculating the transfer. The I-Component in 
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the ES is meant to assist DMs to fund the cost of their municipal administration. 
Theoretically, when district population and household numbers decrease so should the ES 
they receive and thus funds to pay salaries for personnel. 
It is in the RSC replacement grant that the effects of the policy choice will be felt most 
acutely because it is calculated as a quantum of the revenue previously raised on business 
payroll and turnover taxes. With B1s being centres of economic activity removing them from 
DMs means removing a large part of the DMs income-generating sector. With B1s being 
self-sufficient DMs used the replacement grant mostly to support other LMs. However, if B1s 
are removed from DMs the replacement grant reduces and with it the DMs ability to support 
the other LMs. This would effectively make the RSC replacement grant unusable. It would be 
counterintuitive to now recalculate the replacement grant based on the numbers in sparsely 
populated DMs. Funding from the RSC replacement will be literally wiped out. For DMs a 
reduction of almost half of the population and economic activity should see a similar 
reduction in the funding they receive. There will be reduction of politicians. DMs will have 
fewer councillors, which will mean a reduction in transfers to DMs.  
Will the new scheme cost less or more? Adoption and implementation of the policy choice 
will see some savings. There will be savings because of removal of duplication at B1 level. 
B1s will be able to administrate their own planning and development. There will be savings 
on things such as meetings and intergovernmental relations duties. NT will save on transfers 
to DMs based on reduced councillor and personnel numbers. If the new scheme costs more it 
will constrain adoption and implementation of the policy choice. If it costs less it will 
facilitate adoption and implementation of the policy choice.    
6.7 Reduction and reconfiguring of DMs  
A knock-on effect of removing B1s from DMs is that of the 17 DMs there are 3 (Sedibeng, 
Amajuba and Dr Kenneth Kaunda DMs) that will be left with only 2 LMs in the district. 
There are also 4 DMs that will be left with only 3 LMs in the district if the B1s are removed, 
i.e., West Rand, Bojanala, Frances Baard and Cape Winelands DMs. According to Palmer in 
such circumstances where there are only 2 or 3 LMs in a district the span is too small for 
DMs to be efficient considering they are expected to build up high level expertise to support 
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LMs.
178
 This is consistent with the MDBs policy that having only 2 or 3 LMs in a district is 
nothing more than a mere replication of the LMs themselves and therefore leaves the DMs 
redundant. We can cite the disestablishment of Motheo and Metsweding DMs as examples of 
this. Will the reduction of 3 DMs with 2 LMs remaining and the disappearance of at least 3 
DMs due to non-contiguity be constraining or facilitating factors? The answer is yes they will 
be constraining factors because the reduction and disappearance of these DMs would affect 
the vested interests of senior politicians. It would also threaten the job security of personnel 
and the finances of DMs. The answer is also no they will be facilitating factors because most 
of the DMs are small in number and the disestablishment of DMs has happened before in 
Motheo and Metsweding DMs. There is also a cost-saving that will occur as mentioned in 
section 6.6 above, which is in itself an important consideration.   
6.8  Conclusion 
The central policy choice must be considered in light of the above-mentioned likely impacts. 
The policy choice is a feasible one. It will not be too hard to implement it as overall the 
impact will not be too dramatic. Abolition of the two-tier system of local government will 
have a far more dramatic effect. Removing B1s from DMs will have an impact on 
councillors, political party, services, personnel and finances of the DMs. Therefore, the 
numbers of PR councillors within the 17 DMs that will be affected, politicians, personnel 
numbers and finances, as have been listed. Among the politicians there are high level 
members of the ANC who stand to be affected. Practice indicates that senior members are 
deployed to district councils and that many mayors in the DMs are chairpersons of ANC 
RECs. These are significantly powerful people who will be affected by the preferred ANC 
policy choice and as powerful politicians they are sure to lobby against it. Of the 17 DMs 16 
are held by the ANC with Cape Winelands held by the DA. Of the 17 DMs 6 mayors are 
Chairpersons of ANC RECs, 1 is Deputy Chairperson, 5 are members of PECs, 1 is REC 
Deputy Secretary and 3 are ordinary ANC members. If we consider for example the debate 
on the future of provinces, whether to abolish, we see that it has publically disappeared 
completely from ANC discourse. However, strong opposition against it has led to deep 
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lobbying by major politicians. The big question is: how difficult will it be to get this proposal 
approved and implemented? If we reflect on whether the factors enable or inhibit the 
approval and implementation of the proposed reform it appears that the factors may mostly 
inhibit as there remains vested interests to protect and maintain. But, as most policy 
initiatives affect vested interests the big question is: how significant are these vested 
interests?  In this policy option the vested interests are not significant enough to outweigh the 
value of the policy purpose. First, the number of PR councillors to be affected is 156. It is a 
significant number within the context of the policy parameters but not that significant when 
weighed against a total number of over 9,000 councillors. Second, the splitting of the RECs 
may be resisted initially but that resistance should dissipate after the first wave. Third, 
services are unlikely to be affected and therefore unlikely to be changed. Fourth, there will be 
reductions in personnel numbers based on the funding model. The positive effect will be the 
savings in national transfers to DMs based on the reductions (personnel and councillors). 
Fifth, adoption and implementation of the policy choice will necessitate a re-think of the 
current finance model. Overall there could be significant savings on national transfers from 
NT. Finally, the numbers for possible reduction and re-configuration are not significant based 
on total number of DMs. It has been done before and therefore cannot be viewed as a major 
restructuring of DMs.    
In conclusion, the benefits to be gained from this policy option outweigh the negative effects 
and its adoption and implementation are therefore feasible in comparison to the other option 
of total abolition, which would have a much more dramatic impact. Based on this the 
recommendation is to adopt and implement the policy.   
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8. Annexures  
Source: National Blue Drop Report 2011. 
PROVINCE C1 C2 WSAs/WSPs  (Bs/entities)
EASTERN CAPECacadu All B municipalities
Alfred Nzo
Amathole
Chris Hani
OR Tambo
Elundini LM; Gariep LM; 
Maletswai LM; Senqu LM; 
Amatola Water
FREE STATE Fezile Dabi All B municipalities
Lejweleputswa All B municipalities
Thabo Mofutsanyana All B municipalities
Xhariep All B municipalities
GAUTENG Sedibeng All B municipalities
West Rand All B municipalities
KWAZULU NATAL iLembe
Sisonke
Ugu
uMgungundlovu
uMkhanyakude
uThukela
uThungulu
uMzimyathi uThukela Water
Abaqulusi LM; Water and Sanitation SA 
(WSSA)
Amajuba Uthukela Water
Bela Bela LM; Exxaro; Eskom; 
Modimolle LM; Magalies Water; 
Lepelle Water; Mookgopong LM; 
Thabazimbi LM
LIMPOPO Capricorn
Mopani
Sekhukhune
Vhembe
MPUMALANGAEhlanzeni All B municipalities
Gert Sibande All B municipalities
Nkangala All B municipalities
NORTHERN CAPEJohn Taolo Gaetsewe All B municipalities
Namakwa All B municipalities
Siyanda All B municipalities
Frances Baard All B municipalities
Pixley Ka Seme All B municipalities
Kgetleng River LM; Madibeng LM;
Moses Kotane LM; Magalies Water; 
City of Tshwane; Rustenburg LM; 
Rand Water
Dr Kenneth Kaunda Midvaal Water Company
Dr Ruth Segomotsi Mompati Sedibeng Water; Botshelo Water
Ditsobotla LM; Ramotsere Moiloa LM; 
Mafikeng LM
WESTERN CAPECape Winelands All B Municipalities
Overberg All B Municipalities
Eden All B municipalities
West Coast All B municipalities
Central Karoo All B municipalities
Ngaka Modiri Molema
Waterberg
NORTH WEST Bojanala
Zululand
Annexure 1: Represents C1 and C2 categorisations per province. Districts highlighted are WSAs only. 
                 Remaining C2s are both WSAs/WSPs.
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